Should Birds of a Feather Flock Together? Agglomeration by Nationality as a Constraint in International Expansion. by Kim, Heeyon
  
 
 
 
 
 
SHOULD BIRDS OF A FEATHER FLOCK TOGETHER? 
AGGLOMERATION BY NATIONALITY AS A CONSTRAINT 
IN INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION 
 
  
 
by 
 
 
 
Heeyon Kim 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(Business Administration) 
in The University of Michigan 
2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Committee: 
 
 Associate Professor Michael Jensen, Chair 
 Professor Gautam Ahuja 
 Professor Mark S. Mizruchi 
Assistant Professor Maxim V. Sytch 
 Professor James D. Westphal 
 Assistant Professor Minyuan Zhao 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Heeyon Kim 2014 
  
ii 
 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
To my grandmother,  
who will not be able to read a word of this but will, nevertheless, be the most proud  
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 I have grown so much as a scholar and as a person over the past six years. For that, I owe 
the most to Michael Jensen. As my advisor, Michael taught me every step of research and 
scholarship while continuously pushing me to become an independent scholar. As a friend, 
Michael always had my back through probably the most difficult time in my life. Thanks to 
Michael, I leave strong and I leave as Heeyon.  
 I am grateful to my committee members for their generous support. As the father figure 
of the department, Gautam Ahuja has always cared for my intellectual and personal well-being. 
Gautam is and always will be a great exemplar of a passionate teacher, scholar, and mentor. Jim 
Westphal always took time to carefully read my papers and gave constructive feedback. I also 
thank Jim for believing in my potential and supporting me in the background. My very first 
published paper came out of Minyuan Zhao’s class. Minyuan’s office door was always open 
where she was waiting with the sharpest comments. Mark Mizruchi’s economic sociology 
seminar was an eye-opening experience for me. I truly appreciate Mark’s honest opinion and 
hope to, one day, become a scholar like Mark. Maxim Sytch asked the toughest questions but 
never forgot to encourage me throughout the process. I am incredibly blessed to have had the 
most demanding but also the most supportive committee. 
iv 
 
 In addition to my committee, I thank Brian Wu and E. Han Kim for numerous 
constructive conversations and their continuous interest in my progress. 
 The Ph.D. journey would not have been the same without my “family” in Ann Arbor. I 
sincerely thank my academic big sister, Bo Kyung Kim, for setting a great example and 
providing tremendous guidance every step of the way. Soo Young Bae, Otavio Bartalotti, Charu 
Gururaj, Christine Kang, Gareth Keeves, Suntae Kim, Martina Montauti, Samir Nurmohamed, 
Mike Palazzolo, Sun Hyun Park, Adi Pattabhiramaiah, Bea Pereira, Laura Rees, Jason Stornelli, 
and Santhosh Suresh – you made this fun! I will always cherish our happy, stressful, silly, and 
normal everydays. I wish you all the very best going forward and truly hope that our paths will 
cross again.  
 Last but definitely not least, I thank my wonderful family in Korea. My yearly (short – 
due to Michael) trips home refueled my energy level so that I could complete the program. I 
thank my grandmother, aunts, uncles and cousins for always cheering me on. My parents, Hak-
Soon Kim and Kook Kim, and my brother, Seil Kim, have been my strongest supporters. I could 
not thank them enough for their sacrifice and unconditional love.  
  
v 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION ....................................................................................................................................... ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................................................iii 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................. vii 
LIST OF TABLES ..............................................................................................................................viii 
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................................... ix 
CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER TWO. LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................ 9 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Agglomeration ............................................................................ 9 
National Identity and Market Entry ................................................................................................. 13 
Agglomeration by Nationality ......................................................................................................... 16 
CHAPTER THREE. IMPACT OF AGGLOMERATION BY NATIONALITY ON INNOVATION 
IN FOREIGN MARKETS ................................................................................................................... 21 
Internationalization, Agglomeration, and Innovation ...................................................................... 22 
Impact of Agglomeration by Nationality on Innovation .................................................................. 24 
Behavioral Mechanisms of Agglomeration by Nationality ............................................................. 28 
Boundary Condition of the Impact of Agglomeration by Nationality ............................................. 36 
CHAPTER FOUR. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: DATA, METHODS, AND RESULTS .................... 44 
Empirical Setting: Global Pharmaceutical Industry ......................................................................... 44 
Sample .............................................................................................................................................. 46 
Variables .......................................................................................................................................... 48 
Results .............................................................................................................................................. 58 
CHAPTER FIVE. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 74 
vi 
 
Contributions .................................................................................................................................... 75 
Limitations and Future Research ..................................................................................................... 79 
FIGURES ............................................................................................................................................. 81 
TABLES .............................................................................................................................................. 85 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................... 95 
 
  
vii 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1.  Summary of Hypotheses .................................................................................................. 81 
FIGURE 2.  Mediation Effect of Employee Composition ................................................................... 82 
FIGURE 3.  Mediation Effect of Alliance Formation ......................................................................... 83 
FIGURE 4.  Mediation Effect of Technological Trajectory Imitation................................................. 84 
  
viii 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE 1.  Summary Statistics and Bivariate Correlations ................................................................. 85 
TABLE 2.  IV Poisson Regression Results on the Trade-off of Agglomeration by Nationality on 
Exploitative and Explorative Innovation ............................................................................................. 86 
TABLE 3.  Mediation Analysis: Composition of Co-National Inventors (n=2,394) .......................... 87 
TABLE 4.  Mediation Analysis: Co-National Alliance Formation (n=2,394) .................................... 88 
TABLE 5.  Mediation Analysis: Imitation of Technological Trajectory (n=2,394) ............................ 89 
TABLE 6.  Results of the Moderation Effect Analysis (n=2,394) ...................................................... 90 
TABLE 7.  Robustness Check: Economic Area Level Analyses using Firm-Economic Area Fixed 
Effects (n=2,394) ................................................................................................................................. 91 
TABLE 8.  Robustness Check: State Level Analyses using Instrumental Variable Poisson 
Regressions (n=919) ............................................................................................................................ 92 
TABLE 9.  Robustness Check: State Level Analyses using Firm-Economic Area Fixed Effects 
(n=919) ................................................................................................................................................. 93 
TABLE 10.  Robustness Check: Larger Sample Economic Area Level Analyses using Instrumental 
Variable Poisson Regressions (n=4,526) ............................................................................................. 94 
  
ix 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines how national identity affects firm behavior and performance as 
firms expand internationally. Prior studies show that firms often follow the location decision of 
other firms from the same home country when moving abroad, which can lead to agglomeration 
by nationality in foreign markets. While foreign location choices are well understood, we know 
less about the consequences of agglomeration by nationality, an important question because 
shared nationality, while facilitating foreign market entry, may also have unintended negative 
consequences. This study fills this gap by studying the positive and negative consequences of 
agglomeration by nationality and the behavioral mechanisms that account for the performance 
consequences. I, first, argue that agglomeration by nationality can lead to a trade-off for firms by 
enhancing the performance of exploitative innovation but hindering explorative innovation. 
Second, focusing on the negative consequences on explorative innovation, I explore behavioral 
mechanisms such as forming homophilic relationships and imitating strategic decisions that 
mediate the effect of agglomeration by nationality on firm’s explorative innovation performance 
in foreign markets. Finally, I explore firm-level characteristics that make some firms less (or 
more) likely to be negatively affected by agglomeration by nationality. Using a sample of non-
U.S. pharmaceutical firms that conduct R&D in the U.S. from 1980 to 2006, I find empirical 
support for my theoretical arguments.   
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CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
With the IT cluster in Silicon Valley and film production in Hollywood as well-known 
examples, agglomeration of firms in concentrated geographical areas has been a topic of interest 
in research in economics, sociology and management (Krugman, 1991; Saxenian, 1994; Porter, 
1998). Studies have especially highlighted the important role of clusters or agglomeration of 
firms as facilitators of innovation (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993; Audretsch and 
Feldman, 1996). Agglomeration of firms facilitates knowledge transfer across firm boundaries 
and creates collaborative opportunities, which in turn attracts more entrants with new ideas, 
creating a virtuous cycle of innovative activities (Saxenian, 1994; Porter, 1998). On the other 
hand, studies have also shown agglomeration can lead to negative externalities such as increased 
competition and knowledge leakage (Baum and Mezias, 1992; Shaver and Flyer, 2000) and that 
certain firms intentionally avoid agglomerated areas (Alcácer and Chung, 2007). In my 
dissertation, I argue that clusters can, under certain conditions, hinder rather than facilitate 
innovative activities. By focusing on the under-researched but important role of firm identity in 
clusters, I show that agglomerating with firms that share an identity can create self-reliant 
communities and routinize innovation activities, making these firms less equipped for 
explorative innovation. 
 Firm identity, whether defined as a firm’s internal perceptions of its characteristics or 
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external audiences’ expectations to the firm (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Jensen, Kim, and Kim, 
2011), guides not only the actions of the internal members, but also the actions at the firm-level 
and other firms’ behavior towards the focal firm. Moreover, when firms have a shared identity, 
they often have similar behavioral tendencies and also behavioral expectations toward one 
another, activating the function of identity as a magnetic force that pulls these firms together. By 
focusing on shared identity among a subset of firms that co-locate geographically, I highlight 
that agglomeration of firms of similar identities can hinder innovation due to the important role 
of identity functioning as a magnet which increases the tendencies of homophilic relationships 
and alignment of strategies among firms that share similar identities. While shared identity can 
come from many sources, I focus on how nationality as an identity influences firms when they 
are agglomerated in foreign markets. The nationality of firms can impact agglomeration 
dynamics in multiple stages starting from the initial choice of locations: Research has shown that 
firms, in order to reduce the uncertainty in the decision making process, often follow other firms 
of the same nationality when choosing locations in foreign markets (Henisz and Delios, 2001; 
Guillén, 2002; Tan and Meyer, 2011). This study moves beyond simply focusing on the 
existence of agglomeration by nationality to examine the consequences. More specifically, I 
focus on how agglomeration by nationality subsequently affects firms’ behaviors and strategies, 
and consequently their innovation performances after entering the foreign market.  
 When entering foreign markets, co-locating with other firms with the same nationality 
can initially have obvious benefits such as ease of communication (Miller et al., 2008), and 
increased collaboration (Tan and Meyer, 2011). While the entry benefits of agglomeration by 
nationality have been identified, I argue that agglomeration by nationality can, nevertheless, have 
important trade-offs in terms of innovation performance. Because shared nationality has entry 
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stage benefits, firms may initially form relationships and make strategic choices that are easily 
manageable and require less effort. These decisions, however, can become a source of rigidity 
for firms because they may become overembedded (Uzzi, 1996) in a sub-community of firms of 
the same nationality. Being constrained in a sub-community of firms sharing a nationality can be 
especially detrimental when a key objective of the focal firm’s foreign market entry is to obtain 
new knowledge or to strengthen its research and development (R&D). I argue therefore that 
when firms are agglomerated with others of the same nationality, they will face a trade-off in that 
their exploitative innovation activities will benefit from the agglomeration while their 
explorative innovation will suffer.  
Moreover, to further elaborate my theoretical arguments regarding the negative impact of 
agglomeration by nationality on explorative innovation, I focus on the important role of 
nationality as a shared identity that drives firm behavior and unpack specific behavioral 
mechanisms that may lead to such negative outcomes. I focus on relationship building and 
strategy formation in foreign markets as these are key operations of firms in building up 
operations in a new location. I argue that nationality as an identity functions as a magnet that not 
only pulls the firms together to form relationships but also aligns the behavior such as strategy 
formation of the firms that share the identity. First, I propose that agglomeration by nationality 
will promote the homophilic tendencies of individuals and organizations in a foreign market 
which will result in more relationships formed based on nationality. Focusing on the nationality 
composition of employees and the nationality of alliance partners, I argue that nationality based 
relationship building is one mechanism by which agglomeration by nationality leads to lower 
explorative innovation performance. Second, co-locating with more firms from the same home 
country will lead to more imitative strategies among the co-national subset of firms. Based on 
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more information firms have regarding the strategies that co-national firms are pursuing, firms 
are more likely to pay more attention to and, in turn, imitate the trajectories of these firms in the 
focal foreign market. Myopic strategy formation through a limited focus centered around co-
national firms, I argue, is another mechanism by which agglomeration by nationality leads to a 
decrease in explorative innovation performance.  
Finally, I explore the boundary conditions of my argument by examining firm 
characteristics that make certain firms more (or less) resistant to the magnetic pull by shared 
identity. In other words, I examine firm characteristics that moderate the negative relationship 
between agglomeration by nationality and explorative innovation. I argue that certain firm 
characteristics will attenuate the behavioral tendencies such as forming homophilous 
relationships or imitating strategic decisions and thus, make the firms less vulnerable to the 
impact of co-locating with other firms of the same nationality. I, first, examine the order in 
which firms enter the focal foreign location and argue that the firms that are early movers from 
their home country will be less negatively impacted by agglomeration by nationality compared to 
the firms that enter later when a co-national community has already been established. Second, I 
argue that the firms that have experience in other locations of the host country will be less 
affected by the co-national community and thus, experience less negative effects on explorative 
innovation when agglomerated with other firms of the same nationality. Third, I examine the 
culture of the home country of the firms and argue that firms from individualistic cultures as 
opposed to those from collectivistic cultures will exhibit less homophilic tendencies. I, therefore, 
argue that the individualism of the home country culture will moderate the negative impact of 
agglomeration by nationality on explorative innovation in a foreign market. 
 I study the consequences of agglomeration by nationality in an international setting in 
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which firms expand to a foreign market to obtain new knowledge and enhance their innovation 
capabilities. I use a sample of non-U.S. pharmaceutical firms that locate their R&D facilities in 
various U.S. locations and examine how these firms may face a trade-off in terms of different 
types of innovations such as patent generation and drug developments by agglomerating (or not 
agglomerating) with other pharmaceutical firms from the same home country. To further explore 
the mechanisms by which agglomeration by nationality leads to negative explorative innovation 
outcomes in terms of new drug developments, I examine the nationality of the employees, the 
nationality of the alliance partners and the imitation of technological trajectories by nationality in 
the foreign market. In sum, through the theoretical framework and empirical analysis, I develop a 
nuanced and rigorous account of how national identity, a neglected aspect of agglomeration 
literature, affects the behavior of firms and their subsequent performance in foreign markets. By 
integrating firm identity into agglomeration research, I identify another important negative 
externality of agglomeration above and beyond excessive competition. I also move beyond the 
influence of nationality on the location choice of firms when moving to foreign markets, and 
highlight the consequences by illustrating the behavior and strategic choices made in foreign 
markets.  
By studying the negative consequences of agglomeration by nationality in foreign 
markets, my dissertation offers important new theoretical contributions. First, this study 
contributes to research on agglomeration. Prior research has emphasized the importance of 
clusters of facilitating innovation of the member firms (Marshall, 1920; Saxenian, 1994). By 
focusing on subsets of firms that share a nationality within a cluster, I show that tightly-knit 
clusters can come to resemble large firms (Almeida and Kogut, 1997) and become self-reliant 
communities. As a consequence, I show that agglomeration by nationality can lead to innovation 
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becoming routinized and incremental while hindering explorative innovation. Prior research on 
agglomeration has also pointed to the negative externalities of agglomeration (Marshall, 1920; 
McCann and Folta, 2008), especially emphasizing the negative externality that arises from 
excessive competition among firms that locate in geographically proximate locations (Baum and 
Mezias, 1992; Baum and Haveman, 1997). This study, by focusing on organizational identity, 
identifies another important source of negative externality of agglomeration. While prior 
research has mostly focused on the competitive dynamics within agglomerated clusters, I argue 
that when a subset of actors that share an identity agglomerate, homophilous tendencies may 
outweigh the competitive tendencies, but nevertheless lead to negative performance outcomes. 
Using nationality as a salient indicator of shared identity of firms in a foreign market, I theorize 
that firms of the same nationality are more likely to interact in a cooperative manner, rather than 
intensely compete with each other, in a foreign market and consequently become embedded in a 
social structure based on nationality, restricting them from a diverse set of connections. 
Specifically, I propose that when firms that share the same nationality agglomerate, they will 
initially imitate one another’s strategies and form more relationships with actors of the same 
nationality which can consequently lead to negative innovation outcomes.  
Second, my study contributes to the research on foreign market entry by theorizing the 
stages after entry. Prior research on foreign market entry has highlighted the imitative behavior 
of firms of others from the same home country when choosing locations in foreign markets 
(Henisz and Delios, 2001; Guillén, 2002). I shift the attention from the entry stage and focus on 
firm behavior and performance after the initial entry to show the consequences of agglomerating 
by nationality. Following the firms throughout multiple stages of their foreign expansion is 
important given that the factors that lead to location choice may not always lead to positive 
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outcomes in terms of performance in the market. Finally, this study contributes to research on the 
agglomeration of actors by ethnicity/nationality. Most research on agglomeration by nationality 
have focused on individuals and ethnic enclaves (Portes, 2010) and highlighted the benefits of 
agglomeration by nationality in foreign markets. The few studies at the organizational level have 
also emphasized the initial benefits such as ease of communication and information sharing. This 
study shifts attention from the short-run positive consequences of agglomeration to the long-run 
negative consequences, thus highlighting an important trade-off between ease of market entry 
and long-run competitiveness in foreign markets. I certainly do not suggest that agglomeration 
by nationality or homophily do not have benefits but emphasize instead the importance of a long-
term perspective in location choice. 
My dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter Two, I review prior literature on the 
advantages and disadvantages of agglomeration, and the role of national identity in entry and 
agglomeration in foreign markets, and discuss the contribution of my study in each of these areas. 
In Chapter Three, I theorize the impact of agglomeration by nationality on firms’ innovation 
activity and subsequent performance. Specifically, I argue that firms face a trade-off by 
agglomerating with firms of the same nationality in that exploitative innovation performance 
increases whereas explorative innovation performance can decrease. Furthermore, focusing on 
the negative impact of agglomeration by nationality on explorative innovation, I examine the 
behavioral mechanisms that lead to the negative outcomes when firms co-locate with other firms 
from the same home country. Finally, I explore the boundaries conditions of the argument by 
identifying firm-level characteristics that attenuate the negative effects of agglomeration by 
nationality. In Chapter Four, I empirically test the aforementioned theoretical arguments in the 
context of the global pharmaceutical industry. More specifically, I examine how co-location of 
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non-U.S. pharmaceutical firms in U.S. cities (and states) impacts their drug development 
(explorative innovation) and patent generation (exploitative innovation). Finally, in Chapter Five, 
I conclude by discussing my findings, limitations, theoretical contributions and managerial 
implications of my dissertation.  
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CHAPTER TWO. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
In this chapter, I review prior research on agglomeration and its impact on innovation, the 
role of national identity in foreign markets and foreign market entry, and agglomeration of 
individuals and organization by nationality in foreign markets. I begin with research on 
agglomeration and the positive and negative externalities associated with agglomeration before 
introducing national identity as a source of hitherto unexplored types of agglomeration 
disadvantages. I discuss next the importance of nationality as a salient part of firm identity in 
foreign markets, especially with regards to foreign market entry, and its function of connecting 
and aligning firms that share the same identity. Finally, I examine prior research on 
agglomeration by nationality, both at the individual and the organizational levels, and discuss 
how this study contributes to each of these streams of research.  
 
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Agglomeration 
 
Following the seminal work by Marshall (1920), who identified the advantages of 
agglomeration as easier access to a skilled labor market, specialized suppliers, and knowledge 
spillover across firms, theoretical and empirical research has explored the positive and negative 
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externalities of agglomeration (see McCann and Folta, 2008 for a comprehensive review). The 
advantages of agglomeration can be both economic and non-economic. Through larger and 
higher quality labor markets (Krugman, 1991), access to better input markets (Folta, Cooper, and 
Baik, 2006), and knowledge spillovers from surrounding firms (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003), 
agglomeration has been shown to increase productivity. Furthermore, agglomeration can reduce 
the search costs for customers and therefore increase the demand and revenue for agglomerated 
firms (Graitson, 1982; Chung and Kalnins, 2001). The non-economic advantages of 
agglomeration are also important. Firms can, for example, obtain greater legitimacy by choosing 
to locate in areas where other firms have already entered rather than locating in isolation (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Scott and Meyer, 1983). Furthermore, some research suggests that firms may 
benefit more from agglomerating and signaling conformity to the external stakeholders in 
uncertain or volatile situations such as entering new markets (Martin, Salomon, and Wu, 2010). 
In sum, prior research provides numerous motivations for firms to agglomerate in spite of the 
increased competition associated with co-locating with competitors in a geographically 
concentrated area.  
The role of clusters is especially important in terms of facilitating innovative activities. 
Stemming from Marshall’s notion of idea’s being “in the air” (1920: 271), co-location with 
similar industry workers and firms has been shown to increase interactions and become the locus 
of new and creative ideas (Chung and Alcácer, 2002; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). The 
impact of cluster membership, however, is more nuanced and the benefit depends on factors such 
as the type of innovation and the culture within the cluster. Saxenian (1994), for example, argues 
in her study contrasting Silicon Valley to Boston’s Route 128 that Silicon Valley is a home to 
more successful and sustainable technology firms because of its open culture as opposed to 
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Route 128’s relatively closed culture. A recent study also argues that Chinese firms in industrial 
districts of Shanghai benefitted from cluster membership in terms of exploitative innovation but 
the membership had a negative effect on their explorative innovation (Ozer and Zhang, 2014). 
Taken together, these studies suggest that while agglomeration can benefit innovation 
performance in various aspects, the extent to which individual firms benefit from interactions 
with other firms within a cluster varies depending on what type of innovation they pursue and 
also the shared culture within the specific cluster. Building on this stream of research, my study 
takes a step further and argues that national identity plays a key role in creating the culture 
within a cluster. Moreover, focusing on firm behavior based on shared identity, I identify several 
specific mechanisms as to how cluster membership can benefit exploitative innovation but hinder 
explorative innovation. 
Agglomeration is not only associated with positive externalities, but negative 
externalities exist as well. Most importantly, when the domains of firms overlap, as when they 
share geographical spaces, competition among these firms for limited resources increases 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Baum and Mezias, 1992; Baum and Haveman, 1997). Moreover, 
although knowledge spillover among agglomerated firms may be advantageous for the cluster as 
a whole and for certain firms within the cluster, knowledge spillover may not be intentional and 
could represent knowledge leakages for other firms, leaving them vulnerable to competition 
(Shaver and Flyer, 2000; Chung and Alcácer, 2002). While the positive and negative 
externalities mentioned above apply generally across all participating firms in a geographic 
cluster, the competitive dynamics of agglomeration can become more asymmetric if firm 
heterogeneity is considered. The technological capabilities of firms provide one important source 
of firm heterogeneity. Research, for example, shows that technologically more advanced firms 
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tend to contribute more to the pool of knowledge while technologically less advanced firms tend 
to benefit more (Shaver and Flyer, 2000; Alcácer and Chung, 2007). As a result of the 
asymmetric advantages and disadvantages, some technologically advanced firms prefer not to 
agglomerate and instead locate in areas with high academic activity and fewer industrial 
competitors, whereas less technologically advanced firms tend to prefer agglomerated locations 
with more industrial competitors (Shaver and Flyer, 2000; Alcácer and Chung, 2007).  
Another limitation to agglomeration and clusters is that the information flows within the 
cluster can increasingly become homogenous over time. As clusters evolve, the member firms of 
the cluster, rather than learning from competitors outside the clusters, tend to compete and learn 
from local rivals thus leading to less explorative innovations (Pouder and St. John, 1996; Ozer 
and Zhang, 2014). Similarly, Porter (1998) argues that clusters can be victim to groupthink as the 
firms, in the long run, tend to focus inward and are driven by inertia. Similar logic is found in the 
research comparing the advantages of small firms and large firms: While large firms have 
abundant resources to facilitate innovation in general, small firms are the ones that have the 
flexibility to search broadly giving them the advantage for exploration in contrast to the 
routinized and self-reliant large firms that are more equipped for incremental innovations 
(Schumpeter, 1934; Almeida and Kogut, 1997). My dissertation points to one specific condition 
under which clusters can evolve to resemble large firms and hinder certain aspects of innovation 
performance of its members. Departing from prior research that mostly focused on clusters as a 
whole, I examine how clusters can break out into smaller subsets of firms that share an identity 
and examine what the consequences are for firms to belong to certain subsets within a larger 
cluster.  
In the next section, I focus on nationality as an important aspect of firm identity in 
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foreign markets and explain the impact of national identity on foreign market entry. 
 
 
National Identity and Market Entry 
 
Most studies examining the dynamics within clusters have focused on the heterogeneity 
of technological capabilities and argue that the net benefit for individual firms depends on how 
much firms can benefit from others’ spillovers while protecting their own knowledge from 
leaking (Shaver and Flyer, 2000; Alcácer and Chung, 2007). I argue that firm identity is another 
important source of firm heterogeneity that, although not as explicit in its impact on competitive 
dynamics, can influence individual firm’s behaviors and the competitive dynamics within the 
cluster. First, when a subset of firms in a cluster shares an identity, the shared identity can be a 
source of homophilic relationships. As documented in research, whether the source of shared 
identity comes from status, ethnicity or capabilities, shared identity is a strong predictor of 
relationship formation not only among individuals but also organizations as well (Chung, Singh, 
and Lee, 2000; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001; Jensen, 2003; Ingram and Morris, 
2007). Shared identity increases the likelihood that the actors have a common background and 
behavioral traits making the communication between one another easier. Moreover, especially 
under situations of uncertainty, such as entering foreign markets, actors tend to prefer 
relationships with homogenous others (Fiske, 2011: 48). Thus, when a subset of firms share an 
identity within a cluster in a foreign market, shared identity functions as a magnetic force that 
pulls these actors together to facilitate connections and promote homogenous relationships based 
on share identity. For example, research shows that when Japanese auto manufacturers 
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established facilities in the U.S., not only were the buyer-supplier relationships from Japan 
recreated in the U.S., but new relationships were formed in the U.S. between Japanese firms that 
located in the same area (Martin, Mitchell, and Swaminathan, 1995).  
Second, as relationships are formed on the basis of shared identity, these actors are also 
embedded into a social structure whereby certain behavioral expectations arise (Granovetter, 
1985; Jensen, Kim, and Kim, 2011). As a magnet pulls and aligns objects in an orderly manner, 
identity can be a force that aligns the behavior of actors so that they follow a shared social norm. 
Scholars have indeed documented that members of clusters have shared cultures and conventions 
which govern the behavior and interactions between member firms (Saxenian, 1994; Powell, 
Packalen, and Whittington, 2012). Saxenian (1994), for example, argued that firms in the Silicon 
Valley cluster shared a more open culture where boundaries across organizations were porous 
whereas the firms in the Route 128 region shared a more self-reliant culture where firm 
boundaries were distinct. Once firms that share a nationality form relationships and create a 
community in a foreign market, behavioral expectations that correspond with the culture and 
conventions of the home country may arise. For example, in the case of the Japanese auto 
manufacturers, because of the recreated connections between Japanese buyers and suppliers, 
employees may be expected to speak Japanese and behave accordingly with the Japanese 
business culture even though they are located in the U.S.  
While the source of shared identity can vary, I focus on national identity for two reasons. 
First, while nationality may not be an important aspect of firm identity when operating in the 
home market, it becomes an important part of firm identity in foreign markets where the foreign 
firms are often the minority and nationality as an identity becomes more salient (Mehra, Kilduff, 
and Brass, 1998; Mollica, Gray, and Treviño, 2003; Elango and Sethi, 2007). As widely 
15 
 
documented by the country-of-origin literature (Peterson and Jolibert, 1995; Al-Sulaiti and 
Baker, 1998; Verlegh and Steenkamp, 1999), firms are often categorized by their nationality in 
foreign markets by the external audiences such as the media, industry experts and foreign market 
customers. Auto manufacturers, for example, are often grouped together by their nationality – 
Ford and GM as American, Toyota and Honda as Japanese, and Hyundai and Kia as Korean 
carmakers. Not only are firms categorized by their nationality by external audiences, but firms 
from the same home country often exhibit similar behavior in foreign markets. Based on shared 
culture, language, and institutional norms, firms of the same nationality produce similar products, 
target similar customers, and pursue similar strategies in foreign markets (Bird and Beechler, 
1995; Yip, Johansson, and Roos, 1997; Zhang and Dodgson, 2007).  
Second, nationality is an important factor that influences location choice in foreign 
market entry. More specifically, firms often follow other firms from the same home country 
when they choose foreign market locations (Henisz and Delios, 2001; Guillén, 2002). Korean 
manufacturing firms, for example, followed the location choices of other Korean firms when 
moving into China, which eventually resulted in agglomerations of Korean firms in various 
districts of China (Guillén, 2002). Henisz and Delios (2001) also show that Japanese 
multinationals, especially those that lacked foreign market experience, chose to enter countries in 
which other Japanese firms were already present. While studies have focused on the foreign 
market entry choice and, as a result, the agglomeration of firms by nationality in foreign markets, 
the consequences of the agglomeration by nationality has received less attention. Whether it is to 
reduce the uncertainty in location choice (Henisz and Delios, 2001; Tan and Meyer, 2011) or to 
take advantage of the social capital within the ethnic community (Hernandez, 2014), there are 
well-documented entry stage benefits to agglomeration by nationality. The consequences, 
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however, are not so obvious given that most studies did not tract the impact of agglomeration by 
nationality on firms’ performance outcomes after the initial entry. Building on research that 
focuses on entry location decisions, I move beyond the focus of initial entry and examine the 
under-researched but important question of how agglomeration by nationality influences firm 
behavior in a foreign market and subsequent outcomes especially in terms of innovation 
performance.  
 
 
Agglomeration by Nationality   
 
Although not tested directly, studies that have shown the existence of agglomeration by 
nationality have argued that firms imitate the foreign location choice of co-national firms 
because agglomeration by nationality has numerous benefits. First, by co-locating with same 
nationality firms, daily operations may be easier when setting up a subsidiary in a foreign 
location. Some of the firms may already have established relationships from the home country 
which may be an important source of information and partnerships also in the foreign market 
(Martin, Mitchell, and Swaminathan, 1995). Even when the direct relationship between the firms 
is missing, when firms are from the same home country, they tend to have higher trust for one 
another which makes communication easier (Tan and Meyer, 2011). Similarly, co-national firms 
view one another less as a competitor but more as a cooperative partner, reducing the 
competition level among each other (Miller et al., 2008). Moreover, the knowledge obtained by 
same nationality firms in the foreign location may be more relevant and this more useful. Second, 
in addition to the explicit operational benefits, these are legitimacy reasons to which firms 
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choose to agglomerate by nationality. In uncertain situations such as choosing a foreign market 
location in which to expand operations, choosing locations that have already been explored by 
other firms from the home country may help gain legitimacy among constituents in the home 
country (Henisz and Delios, 2001; Guillén, 2002). 
While the phenomenon of agglomeration by nationality has mostly been studied at the 
entry stage for organizations, the consequences of agglomeration by nationality has received 
more scholarly attention at the individual level. At the individual level, research has documented 
the antecedents, characteristics, and the consequences for individuals participating in ethnic 
enclaves (Portes, 2010). Ethnic enclaves such as Chinatowns in various metropolitan cities and 
Cuban (Latin American) residences in Miami are residential areas or economic areas with a high 
ethnic concentration (Wilson and Portes, 1980) and are the typical example of agglomeration by 
nationality of individuals. Ethnic enclaves are formed when individuals immigrate to a foreign 
country and decide to locate and work within a sub-community of individuals of the same 
nationality rather than integrating into the larger economy of the host country. Although there are 
negative effects to participating in ethnic enclaves such as limited upward mobility and 
restrictions and sanctions when deviating from the social norms (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 
1993), most studies have highlighted the positive outcomes: Individuals that participate in ethnic 
enclaves have on average higher earnings than those who do not (Zhou and Logan, 1989; Edin, 
Fredriksson, and Åslund, 2003).  
Although the focus of my dissertation is the consequence of agglomeration by nationality 
at the organization level, the studies at the individual level have important implications for 
organizations as well. Often times, when firms are setting up subsidiaries in foreign markets, 
employees from the home country are sent to the foreign location as expatriates. These 
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individuals, as pointed out in ethnic enclave studies, tend to gravitate towards co-ethnic 
communities. For example, the expatriate families that work in New York have sorted into 
expatriate communities in Westchester – the French in Larchmont, Germans in White Plains, 
Japanese in Scarsdale, and so on (Foderaro, 2000). Especially in foreign locations, nationality 
becomes a key part of identity that drives relationship formation and in turn creates social 
communities that are comprised of actors of the same nationality. The creation of co-national 
social communities can influence the dynamics of organizations in the foreign location because 
social relationships can influence business relationships. For example, when two managers from 
different firms from the same home country have a social relationship, it increases the likelihood 
that they also form business relationships. 
The few studies that have examined the consequences of agglomeration by nationality at 
the organization level have mostly focused on the social capital that can be gained from co-
national actors and how that leads to positive outcomes in foreign markets (Yoo, 2003; Miller et 
al., 2008; Tan and Meyer, 2011; Hernandez, 2014). Miller et al. (2008), for example, showed 
that when Latin American banks located close by one another in North American locations, it 
helped legitimize their presence and operations among co-ethnic customers and, as a 
consequence, led to better survival likelihoods. From a slight different perspective, Hernandez 
(2014) argues that firms can benefit from the social capital of co-national immigrants and shows 
that both the instances of foreign investments and the survival of these subsidiaries are increased 
in U.S. locations with high ratios of co-national immigrants. In addition, a study on immigrant 
entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley argued that the ideal network for immigrants to obtain funding 
for their start-ups, was a dense connection with co-ethnic individuals at the initial stage but the 
co-ethnic networks ties were not as effective in later expansion stages (Yoo, 2003). Although 
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network connections with co-national actors an important aspect for firms in foreign markets, in 
my dissertation, I focus more on the role of national identity in driving firm behavior and 
strategies in the process of building a subsidiary in a foreign location and highlight the negative 
outcomes as opposed to the positives emphasized in prior studies.  
In contrast to the generally positive consequences for individuals, I argue that 
agglomeration by nationality can have a negative impact on certain aspects of innovation. 
Having more actors from the same home country embeds the actors in a social structure that is 
similar to that of their home country which can create behavioral expectations that may differ 
from the economic market logic (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996). For example, actors, both 
individuals and organizations, may face a conflict in terms of the economic imperatives such as 
partnering with actors from a different ethnic group that can bring more economic benefits, from 
the social imperatives such as loyalty towards actors from the same ethnic group. For individuals, 
behaving accordingly to social expectations similar to those of their home country may not 
hinder them from achieving their initial purpose of moving to a foreign country. On the other 
hand, for organizations, emphasis on social imperatives rather than economic imperatives may 
hinder their performance in continuous international competition. Therefore, I argue that, for 
organizations, agglomeration by nationality can create certain social structures and imperatives 
which may ultimately lead to unintended negative consequences.  
  
In this chapter, I reviewed prior research on the advantages and disadvantages of 
agglomeration focusing on how agglomeration affects the innovation outcome of member firms. 
In this study, I take a slightly different view from prior research by focusing on a subset of firms 
that share an identity within a cluster and identify an important negative externality of 
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agglomeration which stems from the function of identity as a magnet that connects and aligns 
firms of the same identity. I focus on national identity of firms that agglomerate in foreign 
markets because prior research has shown that nationality plays an important role in foreign 
market entry. Research on agglomeration by nationality, as reviewed above, has mostly explored 
the benefits of co-locating with co-national actors. My dissertation, however, focuses on the 
under-researched area of the negative impact of agglomeration by nationality and highlights that 
identity, while facilitating foreign market entry, may have unintended consequences once firms 
start their operations in the foreign market. In the next chapter, I discuss why agglomeration by 
nationality can have negative effects on certain types of innovation, propose specific 
mechanisms to explain the pathway by which the negative consequences occur, and explore 
boundary conditions to the main proposition.  
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CHAPTER THREE. IMPACT OF AGGLOMERATION BY NATIONALITY ON 
INNOVATION IN FOREIGN MARKETS 
 
In this chapter, I examine the impact of agglomeration by nationality on innovation 
activity in foreign markets. More specifically, I explore the trade-off that firms face in terms of 
innovation outcomes by agglomerating with other firms from the same home country and 
explore behavioral mechanisms that may explain the outcomes. First, I focus on the direct effect 
that agglomeration by nationality has on innovation and argue that agglomeration by nationality 
can have both a negative and positive impact depending on the type of innovation. Second, 
focusing on the under-researched negative effects of agglomeration by nationality, I explore the 
role of national identity on relationship formation and imitation of strategies as potential 
behavioral mechanisms that mediate the negative direct effect agglomeration by nationality has 
on explorative innovation. Finally, having explored the main effect and the mechanisms in-depth, 
I identify the boundary conditions of the arguments by examining firm-level characteristics that 
make certain firms more resistant to the impact of identity and, therefore, moderate the negative 
effect of agglomeration by nationality on innovation performance. Specifically, I argue that the 
firms that are early movers among the group of firms of the same nationality to a focal location, 
the firms that have more experience in other locations of the host country, and the firms that are 
from home countries with individualistic cultures will be less negatively affect by co-locating 
with more co-national firms in the focal foreign market. See Figure 1 for a summary of the 
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hypotheses. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
In the first section, I examine how co-locating with same nationality firms can influence 
different types of innovation such as exploitative and explorative innovation. I argue that having 
more firms from the same home country in the focal foreign location can have opposite effects 
on exploitative and explorative innovation.  
 
 
Internationalization, Agglomeration, and Innovation  
 
Firms expand to foreign markets for different reasons. Historically, internationalization of 
firms was mostly driven by firms from mature markets seeking new markets to sell existing 
products (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1988). The reasons for foreign expansion have 
recently become more diverse, however, including firms moving abroad for knowledge-seeking 
purposes. Firms locate R&D facilities in more developed countries (Chung and Alcácer, 2002; 
Martin and Salomon, 2003) as well as developing countries (Zhao, 2006), and even newly 
established firms seek knowledge from foreign markets shortly after their founding (Knight and 
Cavusgil, 2004). Accordingly, with the increased importance of knowledge-seeking foreign 
expansion, innovation has also become a key aspect of firm performance along with more 
traditional performance measures such as firm survival, growth or profitability in foreign 
markets. Studies, for example, have examined patent applications and citations, and product 
innovation to measure various aspects of innovation performance of firms in foreign markets 
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(Frost, 2001; Penner-Hahn and Shaver, 2005; Salomon and Shaver, 2005). In the more 
traditional purposes of foreign expansion, choosing a foreign market that is similar to the home 
market was important given that firms wanted to expand to a similar customer base to supply 
existing goods. In the newer model of expanding internationally to obtain new knowledge and 
innovate, it has become more important for firms to not only find locations with the best 
knowledge pools but also locations where they are able to take advantage of and learn from these 
knowledge pools (Feinberg and Gupta, 2004; Alcácer and Chung, 2007). 
An important decision in terms of location choice is whether to locate within an existing 
cluster of firms or to locate in a less populated area given that agglomeration can have an 
important influence on the firms’ innovation. For example, scholars have studied the 
agglomeration of firms in regional clusters like Silicon Valley and Boston’s Route 128 to 
examine how ideas are transferred across firms to facilitate and generate innovation (Saxenian, 
1994; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Fleming, King, and Juda, 2007). Others have argued that 
for certain types of firms or for certain types of innovation, being a member of a cluster can hurt 
the focal firm’s innovation activities. Firms that have high technological capabilities, for 
example, contribute more to the knowledge pool than they benefit, therefore, tend to avoid 
agglomeration (Alcácer and Chung, 2007). The competitive dynamics within the cluster can, 
however, become more complicated once firm identity is brought into the picture. When firms 
choose to locate in a cluster, they may do so for the knowledge pool that exists in the cluster. The 
accessibility of the knowledge pool, however, may depend on the competitive dynamics within 
the cluster. I argue, in the following section, that co-locating with other firms that share a 
national identity may enable firms to obtain more knowledge and resources required for 
exploitative innovation, but hinder them from obtaining knowledge and resources outside the 
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sub-community of co-national firms. As a result, having a large sub-community of co-national 
firms in a larger cluster will increase exploitative innovation performance but decrease 
explorative innovation performance.  
 
 
Impact of Agglomeration by Nationality on Innovation 
 
Agglomeration by nationality on exploitative innovation 
 
I first focus on the direct effect of agglomeration by nationality on firms’1 innovation 
performance in foreign markets. I specifically examine the trade-off that firms face when they 
are located within a community of firms that are from the same home country in balancing 
exploitative and explorative innovation. Prior studies have documented numerous benefits that 
arise from agglomerating with firms from the same home country. First, choosing locations 
where similar firms have already entered reduces a large amount of uncertainty and enhances the 
legitimacy of the foreign expansion (Henisz and Delios, 2001; Guillén, 2002). Second, after 
entry, interactions with firms from the same home country are easier due to the shared culture 
and language. Easier communication establishes a higher level of trust between these firms 
which facilitates the transfer of tacit knowledge regarding the local business environment (Tan 
and Meyer, 2011). Finally, firms that are from the same home country perceive one another less 
as a competitor and more as a cooperative partner, reducing the level of competition in the 
foreign market (Miller et al., 2008). In sum, the benefits mentioned above suggest that having 
                                                   
1 I use the term “firm” in developing the hypotheses, but I refer to the foreign subsidiary of a 
parent firm not the headquarters or the entire firm as an entity. 
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other firms with the same nationality will enhance the efficiency of the operations in a foreign 
market. Especially some of the advantages that accrue at the stage of entry can continue to 
benefit firms as they continue to operate in the foreign location.  
For firms entering foreign markets for R&D and knowledge-seeking purposes, the 
benefits that accrue from easier communication and cooperative partnerships may translate into 
benefits for exploitative innovation. Exploitative innovation which is defined as “the refinement 
and extension of existing competencies, technologies, and paradigms” (March, 1991: 85) 
requires “improvements in existing components and build[s] on the existing technological 
trajectories” (Benner and Tushman, 2002: 679). The key distinction between exploitative and 
explorative innovation is that exploration requires experimentation and shifting to a new 
technological trajectory, whereas exploitative innovation focuses more on learning from local 
search and refinement and reuse of existing routines. Studies have shown that formal 
organizational structures whereby rules, procedures and communication channels are well-
developed can promote exploitative innovation (Zander and Kogut, 1995; Benner and Tushman, 
2003; Jansen, Van Den Bosch, and Volberda, 2006). Firms that are co-located with more firms 
of the same nationality are well-equipped to create these types of formal structures ideal for 
exploitative innovation given the shared language, culture, and potentially similar technological 
backgrounds. Shared nationality can reduce the variance in behavior and activities, helping the 
focal firm achieve operational efficiency and refine their existing competencies in the foreign 
market.  
Therefore, I argue that agglomeration by nationality will benefit firms in terms of 
exploitative innovation.  
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H1: Firms have higher exploitative innovation performance when they are co-located 
with more firms from the same home country in a foreign market. 
 
 
Agglomeration by nationality on explorative innovation  
 
In contrast to exploitative innovation, explorative innovation refers to innovating through 
processes of concerted variation, planned experimentation, and play (Baum, Li, and Usher, 2000). 
While local search and refinement can enhance exploitative innovation, explorative innovation 
requires diverse knowledge that deviates from existing knowledge that mostly comes from 
interactions with distant partners and experimenting with unfamiliar knowledge (Levinthal and 
March, 1993; McGrath, 2001; Benner and Tushman, 2002). While certain firms enter foreign 
markets to incrementally enhance their existing knowledge base, often times foreign R&D 
operations are established in order to further the firms’ distant knowledge searches by interacting 
with partners from diverse backgrounds with diverse knowledge pools. Therefore, the diversity 
of the knowledge pool of the partners can have a significant impact on the direction of 
innovation of the firms in the focal location (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). Especially, by 
locating in existing R&D clusters, firms aspire to interact with not only other firms from the host 
country but other foreign firms that are located in the clusters and tap into the diverse knowledge 
pool in the foreign location. 
While agglomerating with more firms that share a national identity can provide the 
structure and resources required for exploitative innovation, it may simultaneously hinder the 
firms’ pursuit of diverse knowledge towards explorative innovation. Being an only firm with a 
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particular nationality in a foreign location will naturally pressure the firm to seek diverse partners 
and to adapt to the foreign market. Absent a community of co-nationals, the firm may face 
difficulties initially in setting up their operations in the foreign location, but because they feel 
more need to interact with more unfamiliar actors. By interacting with distant partners and 
deviating from their existing routines, however, the focal firm can be exposed to resources 
required for explorative innovation (Jansen, Van Den Bosch, and Volberda, 2006). If a firm is 
agglomerated with many other firms from the same home country, on the other hand, there is less 
pressure to seek diverse contacts and explore distant opportunities given the easier 
communication and information sharing among firms of the same nationality. By joining a 
cluster with more firms from the same home country, firms can take advantage of the entry stage 
benefits and, therefore, are more likely to become embedded in a network of similar actors. 
While firms, in this case, may have an easier experience initially setting up the subsidiary, they 
may be hindered from deviating from the existing relationships and seek less variations in their 
search for knowledge. Furthermore, tightly knit homogenous group of firms of the same 
nationality may also put pressure towards conformity, making it more difficult for firms to be 
flexible and establish connections with firms outside the group. As a consequence, 
agglomeration by nationality can, despite the initial intentions at entry, lead to receiving 
redundant, instead of diverse, knowledge and information and more routinized innovation 
activities, instead of experimentation.  
In sum, co-locating with more firms from the same home country can become a potential 
source of rigidity by decreasing the diversity in knowledge and the flexibility in forming 
relationships, both important factors in generating explorative innovation. Therefore, I posit that: 
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H2: Firms have lower explorative innovation performance when they are co-located with 
more firms from the same home country in a foreign market. 
 
 
Behavioral Mechanisms of Agglomeration by Nationality  
 
Thus far I have explored the trade-offs that firms face in terms of exploitative and 
explorative innovation when agglomerating with same nationality firms in a foreign market. 
Specifically, I argued that agglomeration by national identity positively impacts exploitative 
innovation but negatively impacts explorative innovation. Given that most prior research has 
already documented the mechanisms by which the positive outcomes of agglomeration by 
nationality arise, I now focus only on the negative impact on explorative innovation and unpack 
the pathways by which the negative innovation outcomes emerge. I argue that in the process of 
setting up a subsidiary in a foreign market, national identity functions as a magnet and influences 
the behavior of firms first by pulling co-national firms together to form relationships and second, 
by aligning the strategic behavior of firms. By focusing on the activities conducted by firms after 
entering foreign markets, I examine three different behavioral mechanisms that represent 
important aspects of establishing a subsidiary in a foreign market and that could mediate the 
negative direct effect. After entering foreign markets, firms take various steps to adapt to the 
local market and build up operations in the new location. Early on, firms need to form 
relationships with individuals and organizations in the local market by, for example, hiring new 
employees and forming new alliances with local actors (Makino and Delios, 1996; Anand and 
Delios, 1997). Moreover, firms need to formulate strategies to take advantage of the 
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opportunities in the foreign market. I argue that agglomerating with other firms from the same 
home country will influence the relationships formed in terms of the nationality of employees 
and alliance partners in the foreign market and also impact the strategies of the firm in the 
foreign market, which in turn will subsequently impact the explorative innovation performance 
of firms in foreign markets.  
 
 
Relationship formation 
 
The first mechanism I highlight is the internal and external relationships that firms form 
in foreign markets. I argue that national identity is a magnetic force that facilitates the 
relationship formation between co-national actors which is one mechanism by which 
agglomeration by nationality leads to negative outcomes. Although some employees are 
transferred from the home country, most firms still need to hire new employees in the new 
market in order to better operate in and adjust to the local market (Zaheer, 1995; Mezias, 2002).  
In addition to new employees, firms need to form new partnerships with other organizations in 
the foreign market (Parkhe, 1991; Barkema et al., 1997). Therefore, I focus on two different 
types of relationships – the types of employees that firms hire and the types of alliances that 
firms form in the foreign market. Although employees and alliances are relationships at different 
levels, and they serve different purposes for firms entering new markets, the mechanisms by 
which they mediate the relationship between agglomeration by nationality and innovation 
performance are similar. Therefore, I combine and theorize the two mediators – the nationality of 
employees and the nationality of alliances partners – together under the “relationship formation” 
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umbrella. Relationship formation is important in setting up a foreign subsidiary because 
relationships can influence the degree to which a firm adapts to the foreign market. Firm identity, 
however, can affect what types of relationships are formed and, as a consequence, affect the 
outcome in the foreign market. Therefore, I first argue that agglomeration by nationality will lead 
to more relationships based on nationality and, in turn, lead to lower performance in terms of 
explorative innovation.  
As the first step of the mediation, I begin with the argument that co-locating with more 
firms with the same national identity will lead to more homogenous relationships based on 
nationality. Foreign markets represent a situation in which uncertainty is high (Martin, Mitchell, 
and Swaminathan, 1995; Haveman and Nonnemaker, 2000; Henisz and Delios, 2001), especially 
in terms of knowing with whom to form relationships. Prior studies have emphasized that under 
high uncertainty, actors tend to prefer existing relationships, or forming relationships with 
similar others (Gulati, 1995; Beckman, Haunschild, and Phillips, 2004). Especially in foreign 
markets, nationality becomes a salient part of firm identity that can reduce the uncertainty in the 
counterpart and drive relationship formations. When firms enter a foreign market that lacks a co-
ethnic community, they will be pressured to form relationships with distant or unfamiliar 
partners. However, when many firms from the same home country are co-located in a foreign 
location, a larger social community based on nationality is likely to be created in the region. 
When such communities are created, rather than forming unfamiliar and distant relationships, 
actors have the option to form relationships with similar others or those with the same nationality. 
An ethnic social community in which actors that share the same language and culture can 
interact will naturally create an environment where nationality becomes a more salient part of not 
only the social life of the expatriates but also the corporate and business culture in the focal 
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location. Through the interactions within the co-national community, individuals create social 
networks based on nationality and have the opportunity to find potential co-workers for their 
foreign subsidiary. 
Relationships based on nationality are accelerated because there are obvious benefits, 
especially at the early stage of building a foreign subsidiary. Because firms or individuals from 
the same home country share the same language and business culture, the initial effect required 
to form relationships are lower (Martin, Mitchell, and Swaminathan, 1995). Homogeneity in 
terms of language and culture makes daily interactions more fluent and, due to the predictability 
in interactions, fewer conflicts will arise (Sørensen, 2002; Miller et al., 2008). Therefore, when 
firms are co-located with more firms from the same home country and have a larger pool of 
potential employees in the foreign market, it increases the likelihood that they will prefer to work 
with employees that are from the same home country and thus, have a higher composition of co-
national employees in a foreign market. By the same token, in inter-firm relationships, firms will 
prefer to form partnerships or alliances with other firms that share a nationality, and thus 
business cultures. In other words, agglomeration by nationality first, increases the pool of same 
nationality actors and creates social communities based on nationality, facilitating relationships. 
Social ties, when coupled with the benefits of homogenous ties, leads to more relationships based 
on nationality. Therefore, I argue that co-locating with more firms from the home country in a 
foreign market will lead to more relationships – both in terms of employee composition and 
alliance formations – with individuals and firms with the same nationality. 
Next, to show the second step of the mediation effect, I argue that more relationships 
with co-national actors will lead to negative outcomes in terms of explorative innovation. While 
there are benefits to homogenous relationships (that actually accelerate the formation of 
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relationships based on shared nationality), there are also costs to forming relationships mostly 
with homogenous actors as well (Van den Steen, 2010). Because firms have limits to the number 
of relationships they can form (both in terms of hiring employees and forming alliances), 
developing strong relationships with those of the same nationality will naturally leave less time 
and resources to commit and devote to actors in the host country as well as those from other 
foreign countries. Being confined to relationships with actors of the same nationality can, first of 
all, restrict the diversity in knowledge flow. The importance of bridging between different pools 
of knowledge on creativity and explorative innovation is well documented (Burt, 1992, 2005). 
Being constrained to a sub-community of actors of the same nationality, however, can isolate the 
focal firm from the larger community in the host market despite the possibility that they located 
there initially to obtain new knowledge from new relationships. Increased homogeneity in 
relationships can also hurt firms from explorative innovation because homogenous groups tend 
to be more conservative in their decision making and thus, conduct less experimentation (Van 
den Steen, 2010).  
In sum, I hypothesize that having higher composition of employees of the same 
nationality and forming alliances with firms of the same nationality are two mechanisms by 
which agglomeration by nationality leads to lower innovation performance.  
 
H3: Higher composition of employees of the same nationality as the focal firm mediates 
the relationship between agglomeration by nationality and lower explorative innovation 
performance. 
 
H4: Formation of alliances with other firms from the same home country as the focal 
33 
 
firm mediates the relationship between agglomeration by nationality and lower 
explorative innovation performance.  
 
 
Imitation of technological trajectories 
 
As another mechanism that mediates the relationship between agglomeration by 
nationality and explorative innovation outcomes, I focus on the technological trajectories firms 
follow in the foreign location. I argue that national identity, in addition to connecting similar 
actors, aligns the behavior of co-national actors which is one mechanism by which 
agglomeration by nationality leads to negative outcomes. Along with forming new relationships, 
firms also need to formulate new strategies for their subsidiary in the foreign market. For firms 
that enter foreign markets for R&D, setting the technological trajectory often becomes an 
important strategy that can influence long term performance outcomes (Kenney and Von Burg, 
1999). Especially if the firms expands to the foreign market in pursuit of new knowledge and 
pursue innovation, setting the appropriate technological trajectory may greatly impact what type 
and amount of knowledge the firm can obtain from the focal foreign location. In the process of 
setting s technological trajectory in the foreign market, I specifically focus on which other firms 
the focal firm pays attention to and benchmarks in the foreign market. 
As the first step of the mediation, I begin with the argument that co-locating with more 
firms with the same national identity will lead to more imitation of technological trajectories of 
co-national firms. Research has well documented that imitation is a common response to 
uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993; Jensen, 2006). More specifically, due 
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to high levels of uncertainty and unfamiliarity in foreign markets, firms tend to imitate other 
firms from the same home country when choosing locations in foreign markets (Henisz and 
Delios, 2001; Guillén, 2002; Tan and Meyer, 2011). By similar logic, I argue that firms are also 
more likely to imitate the technological trajectories of firms from the same home country even 
after they have entered the foreign market, especially when they are agglomerated with more 
firms of the same nationality. First, firms are more likely to know or have information regarding 
the operations of other firms of the same nationality. Firms for the same nationality are not only 
more salient and thus, more visible in foreign markets, but also are more likely to have 
established communication channels among each other and to form new relationships based on 
nationality (Martin, Mitchell, and Swaminathan, 1995). Having a large community of firms from 
the same home country will also create a network of co-nationals, increasing the likelihood that 
information flows between these actors. Second, in addition to having more information, having 
a shared nationality may make imitation of strategies easier. Firms from the same home country 
may share similar traits or backgrounds that make it easier to understand each other’s’ operations 
and have more relevant local knowledge that is transferable to one another (Chang and Park, 
2005). Thus, I argue that when firms are agglomerated with more firms from the same home 
country, they will be more likely to imitate or follow the technological trajectories of these same 
nationality firms.  
Next, as the second step of the mediation, I argue that more imitation of technological 
trajectories of co-national firms will lead to a decrease in explorative innovation performance. 
Imitating the technological trajectories of firms of the same nationality can be unproblematic in 
certain context. In fact, studies have shown that imitation can, especially under uncertainty, 
benefit firms by increasing the speed of adopting superior strategies and facilitating collusion or 
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reducing competition (Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). For firms conducting R&D in foreign 
markets, however, imitating the technological trajectories of firms from the same home country 
can lead to negative outcomes such as a decrease in explorative innovation. First, if firms tend to 
pay more attention to those of the same nationality, they will naturally devote less attention to 
the firms outside the co-national community (Porac et al., 1995). When less attention is devoted 
to a diverse set of potential partners or knowledge sources, the search for knowledge can become 
biased in the sense that the local firm is losing out on potentially valuable information. If firms in 
the cluster start imitating one another’s technological trajectories, they can become victim to 
groupthink and collective inertia (Porter, 1998). Tightly-knit clusters, like those of same 
nationality firms, also have the danger of competing within the cluster and evolving inwards 
rather than focusing on the external developments (Pouder and St. John, 1996). In other words, 
shared nationality as an identity can function as a lens through which firms are bound to myopic 
knowledge searches which can have a negative impact on explorative innovation.  
In sum, I argue that imitation of technological trajectories of firms of the same nationality 
is another mechanism by which agglomeration by nationality leads to lower explorative 
innovation performance.  
 
H5: Imitation of technological trajectories of other firms from the same home country 
mediates the relationship between agglomeration by nationality and lower explorative 
innovation performance. 
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Boundary Condition of the Impact of Agglomeration by Nationality  
 
Having presented the arguments for the main effect and the mechanisms, I now explore 
the boundary conditions of the impact of agglomeration by nationality on negative explorative 
innovation performance depending on firm-level heterogeneity. I focus on three firm 
characteristics – the order in which the firm entered the focal location, prior experience of the 
firm in the host country, and the individualistic/collectivistic culture of the home country – that 
can influence the degree to which these firms are affected by national identity. In other words, I 
argue that while identity may function as a magnet to pull similar actors together, some firms are 
more able to resist the magnetic force and therefore, be less negatively affected by agglomeration 
by nationality. Elaborating on the contingencies and examining moderators also provide more 
support of and help validate the mechanisms proposed above.  
 
 
First mover vs. Followers  
 
First, I compare the first movers from the specific home country to the focal location to 
later followers. Studies have shown that first movers enjoy advantages including preemption of 
resources, proprietary learning effects, and larger market shares (Lieberman and Montgomery, 
1988; Mitchell, 1991). I argue that being a first mover can, under certain situations, shield these 
firms from unintended negative consequences. More specifically, I argue that co-locating with 
more firms of the same nationality will have a difference impact depending on the order in which 
the focal firm entered the foreign location. If ten firms from a specific home country, for 
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example, are co-located in a foreign location, the first of those ten firms to enter the location will 
be less negatively affected by agglomeration by nationality than the second of the firms to enter, 
the second less than the third and so on. Following the mechanisms by which firms build up 
foreign operations, I argue that the process of building relationships and forming strategies in the 
foreign market can be different depending on when the firm entered the market and therefore, 
agglomeration by nationality can lead to different outcomes. First, a firm that is the first to locate 
in the focal foreign location among those of the same nationality is initially likely to face high 
uncertainty and unfavorable conditions (Montgomery and Lieberman, 1998; Dobrev and 
Gotsopoulos, 2010) including the absence of a community of co-nationals in the region on which 
they can rely. Therefore, rather than relying on others of the same nationality, the first mover 
firm is naturally pressured to form relationships with actors of various nationalities and integrate 
more into the host market. Second, a first mover firm also does not have others from the same 
home country to benchmark in the foreign market. Therefore, these firms have to either develop 
their own routines and strategies in the focal location or to branch out and benchmark the 
strategies of firms from different countries. As a consequence, even when other firms from the 
same home country later enter the foreign location, first movers are more likely to already have 
developed their own set of relationships and strategies and thus are less likely to be negatively 
influences by the co-national community. 
Firms that are not the first from a specific home country to enter the focal foreign market 
have an alternative path by which they can build up the foreign subsidiary. First, in contrast to 
the first mover, the flowing firms have a precedence of other firms from the same home country 
that have already entered the focal foreign market and thus, face less uncertainty in the market 
(Wernerfelt and Karnani, 1987). Once firms of the same nationality start moving into the same 
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foreign location, sub-communities based on nationality are likely to form. Therefore, the 
following firms are given the option of initially forming relationships with others that share the 
same nationality. Second, by having a community of co-national actors, as well as forming 
relationships, the followers have the opportunity to also follow the technological trajectories of 
firms of the same nationality. In sum, while following firms may, in certain aspects, benefit from 
having other firms of the same nationality in the focal foreign market, forming relationships with 
these firms and emulating the technological trajectories of these firms may not always result in 
better innovative performance. On the other hand, the first mover firms may struggle initially in 
the foreign market given the lack of benchmarks but later on, when a community of co-national 
firms form in the focal foreign market, they may be better equipped to take advantages of the 
benefits and be less affected by the negative aspects of co-locating with same nationality firms. 
Therefore, I posit that the explorative innovation performance of first movers will be less 
negatively affected by agglomeration by nationality, whereas the followers will be more 
negatively affected. 
 
H6: The negative effect of agglomeration by nationality on explorative innovation 
performance is weaker for firms that are the first movers from a focal home country in 
the focal location. 
 
 
Prior experience in the host country 
 
Next, I compare firms that have already entered other regions in the foreign country to 
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those that do not have prior experience in the host country. Studies have shown that firms benefit 
differently from agglomeration depending on their technological capabilities and experiences 
(Shaver and Flyer, 2000). The negative impact of agglomeration by nationality is therefore also 
likely to differ depending on the firm’s ability to access resources, form relationships, and 
develop and execute strategies in foreign markets. Prior studies provide evidence that the firm’s 
prior experience in other regions of the host country substantially influences their activities in the 
focal location. As firms gain experience within the host country, they develop location specific 
knowledge and strategies (Shaver, Mitchell, and Yeung, 1997), making them less dependent on 
knowledge and resources from external actors (Tuschke, Sanders, and Hernandez, 2013; 
Hernandez, 2014). Therefore, the importance and impact of agglomerating with firms from the 
same home country should differ across firms with different levels of experience in the host 
country.  
Firms that already have some experience in the host country, although not exactly the 
same location as the focal location, are, first, less likely to be dependent on others of the same 
nationality, and therefore, less likely to form relationships based on nationality. Prior experience 
in the foreign market may have given these firms expertise in formatting relationships with more 
distant partners and may also have relationships with actors of various nationalities from prior 
entries that can be extended in the focal market as well. On the other hand, firms without 
experience in the host country are more likely to rely on other firms of the same nationality in 
order to build up the subsidiary especially at the entry stage. When these firms are agglomerated 
by nationality, the ones that lack experience in the host country are the ones more likely to be 
influenced by the community of same nationality actors and form more relationships based on 
nationality. Second, firms with more experience in the host country are also less likely to imitate 
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other firms from the same home country in terms of the strategies in the foreign market. These 
firms are more likely to have entered the focal location with a better sense of strategic directions, 
whereas firms with less experience in the general foreign market will be more likely to follow 
strategic directions of similar firms in the focal location. Therefore, the firms with less 
experience in the host country will be affected more by co-locating with other firms of the same 
nationality. 
 
H7: The negative effect of agglomeration by nationality on explorative innovation 
performance is weaker for firms with more prior experience in other locations of the host 
country. 
 
 
Collectivistic vs. Individualistic culture of the home country 
 
Finally, I compare firms that are headquartered in countries with collectivistic cultures to 
those headquartered in countries with individualistic cultures. The cultural backgrounds of the 
firms are likely to influence their behavior in the foreign market and influence the degree to 
which firms are impacted by agglomeration by nationality. Among various cultural 
characteristics, I focus on the difference between individualism and collectivism which refers to 
how actors define themselves and their relationships with other of the group. In individualistic 
societies, the actors are expected to look after oneself while in collectivistic societies, actors are 
integrated into cohesive in-groups that protect one another (Hofstede, 1980). In other words, 
individuals from collectivistic cultures tend to have a “preference for tightly knit social 
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frameworks” whereas those from individualistic cultures prefer loosely knit social structures 
(Hofstede, 1984: 83). At the organizational level, research has provided evidence that firms from 
collectivistic and individualistic cultures also exhibit differences in behavior such as having 
different owner-manager relationships and consequently differences in R&D investments (Lee 
and O’Neill, 2003). When firms are co-located with other firms from the same home country, 
depending on the cultural characteristics of the home country, firms are likely to exhibit 
differences in their behavior. First, given their tendency to prefer tightly knit relationships, firms 
from collectivistic cultures are more likely to form relationships with others based on shared 
nationality. Studies have shown, for example, that firms from collectivistic cultures tend to form 
tight relationships among one another such as forming alliances involving equity ties whereas 
firms from individualistic cultures preferred arms-length alliances (Steensma et al., 2000). Along 
similar lines, the tendency to form homophilic relationships in a foreign location is likely to be 
stronger for firms from collectivistic cultures. Second, given the tendency to focus on in-group 
members, firms from collectivistic cultures are also more likely to pay more attention to one 
another and follow the strategies or technological trajectories of co-national firms.  
Firms from individualistic cultures, on the other hand, have a weaker tendency to prefer 
tighter relationships with in-group members. Therefore, even when these firms are agglomerated 
with others of the same nationality, they are less likely to hire same nationality employees and 
form alliances with other firms from the same home country. Second, given the fewer 
relationships with co-national actors and the weaker tendency to focus on in-group members, 
firms from individualistic cultures are less likely to pay more attention to in-group members in 
the foreign location and thus, less likely to imitate the technological trajectories of other firms 
from the same home country. In sum, while nationality is an important aspect of firm identity 
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especially in foreign markets, the cultural background of firms can impact the degree to which 
these firms gravitate towards one another in the foreign market. I argue that firms from 
collectivistic cultures will show a stronger tendency to forms relationships with others from the 
same home country and imitate the strategies of these firms, compared to firms from 
individualistic cultures. As a consequence, firms from collectivistic cultures are more likely to be 
impacted negatively by agglomeration by nationality. Therefore I posit that: 
 
H8: The negative effect of agglomeration by nationality on explorative innovation 
performance is stronger (weaker) for firms that are from a more collectivistic 
(individualistic) home country. 
 
In this chapter, I explored impact of co-locating with other firms from the same home 
country on the focal firm’s innovation performance in a foreign location. I first argued that by 
agglomerating with co-national actors, firms may benefit in terms of operational efficiency but 
suffer in terms of gaining access to diverse knowledge which results in a trade-off between their 
exploitative innovation and explorative innovation. Focusing on the less-research area of the 
negative consequences on explorative innovation, I further examined the behavioral mechanisms 
that lead to the negative outcomes. I emphasized the importance of national identity functioning 
as a magnet to promote homogenous relationships such as hiring co-national employees and 
forming alliances with co-national firms which in turn hinders the explorative innovation 
performance of the focal firm in the foreign market. I also argued that shared national identity 
will increase the likelihood of co-national firms imitating one another’s technological trajectories 
which will also lead to lower explorative innovation. Finally, I argued that firms with certain 
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characteristics such as first movers from the home country, those with more experience in 
foreign markets and those from individualistic cultures are better able to resist the magnetic force 
of national identity and therefore, will be less negatively affected by agglomeration by 
nationality. In the next chapter, I empirically test the theoretical arguments using a sample of 
non-U.S. pharmaceutical firms conducting R&D operations in various U.S. locations.     
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CHAPTER FOUR. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: DATA, METHODS, AND RESULTS 
 
 
Empirical Setting: Global Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
I study the impact of agglomeration by nationality on innovation activities in the setting 
of the global pharmaceutical industry where firms expand overseas for R&D and innovation. I 
focus on the non-U.S. pharmaceutical firms that enter the U.S. from 1980-2006 to conduct R&D, 
generate patents and develop new drugs. The global pharmaceutical industry provides an 
interesting setting to test my arguments for several reasons. First, the pharmaceutical industry is 
highly globalized and firms of many nationalities agglomerate in geographically concentrated 
areas worldwide for R&D collaboration. Firms invest approximately 20% of the revenue on 
R&D, confirming that it is a highly knowledge intensive industry in which innovation is an 
important aspect of firm performance (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996). The estimated cost of 
discovering, developing and launching a new drug has increased to more than $1.5 billion in 
2010 (Turk, 2013). To manage the strong demand on R&D, pharmaceutical firms set up R&D 
facilities worldwide in their effort to learn from the expertise of other organizations (Cockburn, 
2008). Second, new drug development is a long and complicated process that on average takes 
12 years (Turk, 2013). During the process of discovering, developing, and launching a new drug, 
firms also patent their intermediary innovations. The diverse outputs of innovations such as 
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patents and new drug developments, provides a unique opportunity to compare the firm’s 
performance on exploitative and explorative innovations (Acs and Audretsch, 1989; Cardinal, 
2001; Penner-Hahn and Shaver, 2005).  
Third, I focus on non-U.S. pharmaceutical firms entering the U.S. market because the 
U.S., as well as being the leader in terms of pharmaceutical R&D, has historically been a very 
attractive location for pharmaceutical R&D due to its limited use of price regulation and 
government purchasing, and its strong patent protection rights (Cockburn, 2008). Given that the 
U.S. is the locus of knowledge and innovation in the industry, most foreign firms enter the U.S. 
market in order to benefit from knowledge spillovers. Moreover, because the U.S. is an 
important market for foreign pharmaceutical firms, most innovations should be filed under the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for patent protection which also makes it 
easier to track the location of R&D activities of the firms (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996). 
Finally, nationality plays an important role in terms of the products developed by pharmaceutical 
firms: The demand for pharmaceuticals varies with country-level institutions, policies, and 
culture and thus, pharmaceutical firms tend to produce different types of products depending on 
their nationality (Fabrizio and Thomas, 2012). The level of treatment for migraine headaches, for 
example, varies significantly across cultures (reported number of patients is significantly higher 
in individualistic cultures) even though the actual incidence of migraine headache is very similar 
across countries (Unger, 2006). This provides a setting where I can observe variations in drug 
portfolios by the nationality of the firms.  
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Sample 
 
Pharmaceutical firms are extremely heterogeneous in terms of their size and the activities 
in which they participate. In my empirical analyses, I focus mostly on the firms that are involved 
in explorative innovation or competing to develop new entity drugs. Therefore, I focus on a 
sample of pharmaceutical firms that are involved in explorative innovation or, in my setting, 
developing new entity drugs. New entity drugs exclude rebranding or repackaging of existing 
drugs as well as generics, making them an appropriate measure of explorative innovation for 
pharmaceutical firms in a new market (Cardinal, 2001; Fabrizio and Thomas, 2012). I, first, 
identify a full list of new entity drugs developed in the U.S. from 1980-2006 provided by IMS 
Health, a leading provider of market data for healthcare and pharmaceutical industries (Fabrizio 
and Thomas, 2012). My main sample consists of 80 non-U.S. pharmaceutical firms from 16 
different countries
2
 that developed 231 out of 485 total new entity drugs in various U.S. locations 
during 1980-2006. 
The main sample consists of pharmaceutical firms that have developed at least one new 
entity drug over the period of 1980-2006 which may be a representative sample of firms 
participating in explorative innovation but may not capture the community of pharmaceutical and 
related firms that interact in a focal location. As an alternative I also identify a larger sample as a 
robustness check to supplement the analyses using the main sample. For the larger alternative 
sample that may better represent the community of pharmaceutical and related firms, I follow 
Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) and include all firms that have patented in pharmaceutical 
and related USPTO primary patent classes (Drugs: 424, 514; Surgery and medical instruments: 
                                                   
2
 The countries represented are as follows: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom. 
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128, 600, 601, 602, 604, 606, 607; Biotechnology: 435, 800; Miscellaneous – drug and medical: 
351, 433, 623). This sample comprises of approximately 1,100 non-U.S. pharmaceutical related 
firms that patented in the U.S. from 1980-2006. I include both the number of pharmaceutical 
firms developing new entity drugs and the number of firms patenting in related areas as 
independent variables in all the analyses. As a robustness check, I conduct the entire analyses 
using a sub-sample of the alternative sample of firms as well as the main sample, not just 
including them as independent variables (See Table 10). 
I use multiple other sources of data to supplement the data on new entity drug 
development and patenting activities. First, IMS Health’s drug development data links the 
individual drugs to related patents. I then link the detailed patent information from the USPTO 
database to determine the U.S. city and state-level location of the drug development which is 
also used to determine firm (subsidiary) location within the U.S. In addition, the patent database 
is used to construct a list of employees (inventors) by firm, and to construct multiple control 
variables including the firms’ history of patents, and the firms’ areas of expertise. Second, to 
identify the ethnicity of individual employees (inventors listed on patents), I used two databases 
from Melissa Data Corporation and List Services Direct, both of which were originally 
developed to enhance the quality of target marketing by attaching the ethnicity of individuals 
using their first and last names (Kerr, 2008a; Kerr, 2008b). I use two separate databases to code 
all the names of inventors in order to crosscheck the possible errors from either one of the 
databases. The final output from Melissa Data Corporation and List Services Direct gave an 
estimate of 90.8% and 87.1% accuracy, respectively. Finally, I used the SDC database to collect 
information on alliance formation between firms (Schilling, 2009). In order to control for the 
misinformation of the SDC database, I crosschecked the alliance information by searching the 
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news database for each alliance to verify the information provided. 
 
 
Variables 
 
Boundaries of Agglomeration  
 
To measure the impact of agglomeration by nationality on firms’ innovation 
performance, I first have to define the boundaries of agglomeration. Following prior studies on 
agglomeration in the U.S. context, I use economic areas as my primary boundary to define 
agglomeration (Alcácer and Chung, 2007). The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) divides the 
U.S. into 171 economic areas based mostly on commuting data.
3
 Each economic area consists of 
one or more economic nodes (metropolitan or micropolitan statistical areas that serve as regional 
centers) and surrounding counties that are economically connected to these nodes, including both 
the work site and residence of its labor force (Johnson and Kort, 2004).  
U.S. states also represent legal boundaries by which agglomeration can be defined and 
have been used as geographic units in research on agglomeration (Shaver, 1998; Shaver and 
Flyer, 2000; Singh and Marx, 2013; Hernandez, 2014). I use economic areas as the primary 
boundary given that my theoretical arguments assume that firms within the same boundary 
interact with one another both socially and for business purposes therefore making economic 
areas that bound work and residential sites more appropriate. Some states, for example, such as 
California is too large to assume that firms in San Francisco and San Diego actually interact, and 
                                                   
3
 The BEA first established the economics areas in 1977 and continues to redefine them based on 
the population and economic growth in the U.S. Given the period of my study, I use the 
definition and boundary from 1995. 
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in some states such as New York and New Jersey, cities cross state boundaries making the state 
boundary almost meaningless. Nevertheless, I conduct the same analyses using U.S. states as the 
boundary for agglomeration (see the section on robustness checks). 
Dependent Variables  
 
Using U.S. economic areas (states) as the boundaries of agglomeration, I measure firms’ 
innovation performance by their activities within the focal economic area (state). First, to test the 
impact of agglomeration by nationality on exploitative innovation stated in Hypothesis 1, I count 
the number of patents generated in the economic area (state) as a proxy of exploitative 
innovation performance (Acs and Audretsch, 1989; Penner-Hahn and Shaver, 2005). Second, to 
test the impact of agglomeration by nationality on explorative innovation hypothesized from 
Hypothesis 2 onwards, I count the number of new entity drug developments in the focal 
economic area (state) in the next five years.
4
 Although in other contexts, patents can be regarded 
as explorative innovation, given that new entity drugs are based on multiple new molecule 
patents, I regard a new entity drug a more novel and radical innovation outcome compared to a 
single patent. The origin or the location of the patents and the new drugs are identified using the 
address of the first inventor on the patents. While the original location of patents is easily 
identifiable, frequently, multiple patents are related to a single drug development, making the 
origin difficult to identify.
5
 In these cases where the multiple patents are filed from different 
                                                   
4
 I aggregate the number of drug developments given the long timeline in generating a single 
new entity drug. I also use three, seven, and ten year periods as robustness checks and the results 
show similar patterns. 
5
 In some cases, the locations of the inventors are outside the U.S. In most of these cases, the 
address of the inventor is in the home country of the parent firm, suggesting that inventors of the 
home country and those in the host country collaborate in innovative activities. While the 
process of co-development is interesting and an important research area, my study does not focus 
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locations, I assign the drug to the economic area (state) that is the most prevalent location. Using 
economic areas (states) as the geographic unit of agglomeration, I can observe the same firm 
located across multiple locations in the U.S., all of which have different levels of agglomeration 
of co-national firms, and, therefore, compare the exploitative and explorative innovation 
performance of the same firm across multiple locations with varying degrees of agglomeration.  
Independent Variables  
 
The main independent variable of interest is the degree of agglomeration by nationality 
within a U.S. state, which I measure, first, by counting the number pharmaceutical firms from 
my main sample (one that have developed new entity drugs from 1980-2006) that are from the 
same home country within the economic area (Same Nationality Firms (Pharma)). Because I 
cannot observe firms exiting the focal location with my data, I assume that firms have exited or 
discontinued their R&D operation within a state if they have not patented in the focal location for 
three years. I also expand the period to five years and the results remain unchanged. While the 
non-U.S. pharmaceutical firms in the main sample may account for the firms that compete in the 
market for innovation, they may also interact and collaborate with a broader set of 
pharmaceutical related firms in foreign markets. Therefore, I also measure the degree of co-
national agglomeration using a broader alternative sample of firms in the pharmaceutical and 
related industries (Same Nationality Firms (Related)).  I include both variables to indicate the 
degree of agglomeration by nationality in the analyses.    
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
on the involvement of the parent firm (other than including a parent firm fixed effect in the 
models) and leave this area open for future research. 
51 
 
Mediators 
 
First, to examine if firms that agglomerate with co-national firms tend to have a higher 
composition of co-national employees and if that leads to lower explorative innovation posited in 
Hypothesis 3, I first use the patent data to obtain a list of inventors of each firm in the focal 
foreign location. Then I use two ethnicity-name matching databases (Melissa Data Corporation 
and List Services Direct) to infer the nationality from the inventors’ names. I only use the 
nationalities when the two databases show a match, and code all other cases as unknown.
6
 After 
having identified the nationality, I count the number of inventors of the same nationality (logged) 
as the focal firm in the focal year (Same Nationality Inventors), controlling for the total number 
of inventors of other or unknown nationalities.  
 Second, to test the second proposed mediation in Hypothesis 4 that firms that are co-
located with more firms of the same nationality will form more alliances with co-national firms 
and that, in turn, will lead to lower explorative innovation, I first obtain a full list of alliances 
among firms in my sample from 1980-2006 from the SCD database. Then, to ensure alignment 
with my theoretical arguments, I exclude all alliances that are not related to research and 
development as well as those that are defined at the international level. If an alliance is formed 
between two firms in the U.S. and the two firms are in the same locations, I count these alliances 
as relevant within the focal economic area (state). After having identified the relevant alliances, I 
count the number of alliances with firms of the same nationality as the focal firm in the focal 
year (Same Nationality Alliances), controlling for the total number of alliance with firms of other 
nationalities. 
                                                   
6
 American/English made up the largest group with 33.7%, German second with 18.6% and 
Italian third with 5.6%.  
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Finally, to test Hypothesis 5 that firms that are agglomerated by nationality are more 
likely to follow the technological trajectories of others firms of the same nationality and that will 
lead to lower explorative innovation, I calculate an imitation ratio based on the overlap of patent 
portfolio between the focal firm and the other firms of the same nationality in the same economic 
area controlling for the baseline likelihood of imitation given the overlap in therapeutic areas. 
First, I use the subclass of patents developed in the focal location and divide a weighted sum of 
patent subclasses that overlap with same nationality firms by the total number of patents by the 
focal firm. For example, if firm i patents in one in subclass 101, and two in subclass 102, and all 
other firms from the same home country patents five in subclass 101, and three in subclass 102, 
firm i's imitation ratio would be [(5*1)+(3*2)]/3= 11/3.  Then, I compare this number with the 
baseline likelihood of imitation by dividing a weighted sum of the therapeutic areas of the all 
previously developed drugs by the focal firm that overlap with other co-national firms by the 
total number of drugs by the focal firm, the same procedure as above. The imitation ratio is 
obtained by subtracting the second number by the first (Same Nationality Imitation Ratio). In 
other words, I calculate the degree of overlap in patent subclasses controlling for the previous 
overlap in therapeutic areas. This ratio can be influenced by other factors including the number 
of patents by same home country firms. I discuss this issue in detail in the next section where I 
explain the control variables.  
     
Moderators 
 
From Hypothesis 6 to Hypothesis 8, I explore the boundary conditions of the previous 
arguments that agglomeration by nationality can hinder explorative innovation. I argue that firm-
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level characteristics can attenuate the negative effect of agglomeration by nationality on 
explorative innovation and examine three different moderators. First, to test Hypothesis 6, I 
focus on the order in which the focal firms entered the location compared to other firms from the 
same home country. By focal economic area, I number the entry sequence of the firm for each 
home country (Entry Sequence (by Nationality)). For example, for all Swiss firms that have an 
R&D operation during 1980-2006 in economic area #1, the first one to enter will be coded as 1, 
the second as 2, and so on. I also divide the sample into the first mover and followers (all firms 
that are not the first to enter) and use a binary variable and the results remain the same. Second, 
to test Hypothesis 7, I examine the prior experience the focal firm had in the U.S. prior to their 
entry into the focal economic area. As a proxy for experience, I count the number of prior entries 
the focal firm had into the U.S. before entering the specific location (Prior Experience (# of 
Prior US Entries)). Third, I focus on the cultural background of the home country and test 
whether the firms from more individualistic culture will be less negatively affected by 
agglomeration by nationality as posited in Hypothesis 8. To measure the degree of individualism 
of the home country of the focal firm, I use Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov's (2010) survey 
measure Individualism versus Collectivism (Individualism (Hofstede score)).  
 
 
Control Variables  
 
I control for firm-economic area level, firm-level, and economic area level characteristics 
that could affect the relationship between the independent, mediation, and dependent variables. 
First, at the firm-economic area level, I control for the number of immigrants from the same 
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home country of the focal firm in the economic area (Same Nationality Immigrants). I use the 
U.S. immigration data from a 5% public use micro sample (IPUMS) from the 1980, 1990 and 
2000 census (Hernandez, 2014) to calculate the number of immigrants by each nationality. 
Having a large community of co-national immigrants in the economic area can affect the 
likelihood of entry of firms of the same nationality and also different aspects of their 
performance in the foreign market (Hernandez, 2014). Because I focus mostly on interactions 
between actors in the pharmaceutical or related industries, I control for the general population of 
co-national actors in the focal foreign location. Second, I control for the number of other 
nationality pharmaceutical firms including the American firms that develop new entity drugs in 
the focal economic area (Other Nationality Firms (Pharma)). I also include the number of 
pharmaceutical related firms from other countries that patent in the economic area but not 
develop new entity drugs (Other Nationality Firms (Related)). It is important to include these 
variables because I can tease out the effect of agglomeration in general from the effect of 
agglomeration with same home country firms on exploitative and explorative innovation 
performance. A positive coefficient of this control variable will infer that there are positive 
externalities from co-locating in general with more pharmaceutical firms whereas a negative 
coefficient will infer that there are general negative externalities of agglomeration on innovation 
performance.  
I also add a number of variables that may affect the mediators included in the models. 
First, I control for the total number of other and unknown nationality employees (Total 
Inventors), and the total number of alliances (Total Alliances) to ensure that number of 
employees and alliances with actors of the same nationality doesn’t simply reflect the size of the 
firm or operations in the focal economic area. The imitation ratio of firms from the same home 
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country can be higher if the firms of the same nationality are simply patenting more (higher 
probability of overlap) and thus, I control for the number patents by firms of the same nationality 
(Total Patents by Same Nationality Firms). While firms may be imitating R&D strategies of 
firms from the same home country, they could also be following their own firm’s R&D trajectory 
or patenting in areas where other firms, not just same nationality ones, are patenting. I include a 
self-imitation ratio (Self Imitation Ratio) and other nationality firm imitation ratio (Other 
Nationality Imitation Ratio), calculated using the same procedure as the Same Nationality Firm 
Imitation Ratio to control for these possibilities.  
At the firm-level, I account for the firm’s stock of prior knowledge and capabilities by 
including a control variable for the cumulative number of drugs the firm has developed at the 
parent-firm-level (Cumulative Drug Developments).
7
 Moreover, given the high frequency of 
merger activity in the pharmaceutical industry, I include a binary variable to indicate for merger 
year to next five years (Merger Year +5). At the economic area (state) level, I include the 
percentage of individuals in science and engineering occupations out of the total workforce in the 
economic area which represents the available R&D resources in the location (R&D Workforce). 
As an alternative specification, I included the economic area GDP as a control variable and the 
results remained stable.  
 
 
Endogeneity  
 
One main concern measuring location-based performance is that performance can be an 
                                                   
7
 For Models 1-3 in Table 2 where I focus on the number of patents in the focal location, I 
include the cumulative number of patents instead. 
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endogenous outcome of firm’s choice of location (Shaver, 1998). Since I only observe 
innovation performance in the focal location if an entry occurs, the performance outcome is 
dependent on the initial location choice and thus, I control for the selection bias in two ways. 
First, I account for the potential endogeneity issue by using the instrumental variable Poisson 
regression (Mullahy, 1997). Following prior research, I identify instrumental variables including 
geographic distance between the home country and the focal location, yearly inches of snow in 
each economic area and the average temperature difference between the home country of the 
firm and the focal location (Hernandez, 2014), that affect firms’ probability of entering the focal 
economic area but not the subsequent innovation performance.
8
 Second, as an alternative to the 
instrumental variable approach, I include firm-economic area pair fixed effects in the models to 
control for the heterogeneity across the firm-economic area pairs. These fixed effects will control 
for any matching factors between the firm and the focal location that are time invariant. The 
results are robust using both approaches for accounting for endogeneity and I present both results 
below.  
 
 
Statistical Analysis  
 
To test the direct effect of agglomeration by nationality on exploitative and explorative 
innovation (Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2), I use a Poisson regression as the dependent 
                                                   
8
 The results reported in the main analyses instruments the endogenous variable Same 
Nationality Pharma Firms using the three instrumental variables as the exogenous instrumental 
variables. To ensure the significance for the instruments, I followed Stock and Yogo’s (2005) 
approach. The joint significance of the instruments results in the F-statistic of 15.39, which 
exceeds 13.91, the recommended critical value ensuring bias under 5%. The Sagan test also 
validated the exogeneity of the instrumental variables, indicating they are uncorrelated with the 
structural error (p > 0.10). 
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variables are a count of the number of patents and the number of drug developments. The data 
does not show signs of overdispersion (Long, 1997), but I also conduct robustness checks using 
negative binomial regression, and the results remain unchanged. In this paper, I only report the 
results using Poisson regressions. To correct for the inconsistency in the estimates and to make 
interpretation straight forward, I log all the independent and control variables (Gourieroux, 
Monfort, and Trognon, 1984; Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984; Winkelmann, 2008).  
Next, I focus on explorative innovation or new drug development and test and mediation 
and moderation effects. To test the mediation effects (Hypothesis 3, 4 and 5), I follow the 3-step 
approach developed by Baron and Kenny (1986). Specifically, I regress the number of firms of 
the same nationality on the number of new drug developments (Model 8 in Table 3; Model 11 in 
Table 4; Model 14 in Table 5), the number of firms of the same nationality on the mediators 
(Models 9 in Table 3; Model 12 in Table 4; Model 15 in Table 5), and the number of firms of the 
same nationality and the mediators on the number of new drug developments (Models 10 in 
Table 3; Model 13 in Table 4; Model 16 in Table 5). I finally if the indirect impact of the number 
of co-national firms on the number of drug developments through the mediator is stastistically 
significant using the z-mediation test (Iacobucci, 2012). The commonly used Sobel, Goodman, 
and Aroian tests were developed for linear OLS regression and are therefore, unlike the z-
mediation test (Iacobucci, personal communication, 2013), not directly applicable to non-linear 
count models (MacKinnon, 2008; Iacobucci, 2012). Finally, the moderation effects posited in 
Hypotheses 6 to 8 are also tested using Poisson regressions. 
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Results 
 
As the main set of results, I present the analyses using my main sample (pharmaceutical 
firms that have developed new entity drugs) with economic areas as the geographic unit of 
agglomeration and instrumental variable Poisson regression to control for endogeneity issues. I 
begin by presenting the results illustrating the trade-off on exploitative and explorative 
innovation of agglomeration by nationality (Table 2) that provide support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Next, focusing on the negative impact of agglomeration by nationality on explorative innovation, 
I test the proposed mechanisms that explain the pathway by which the negative impact occurs in 
Table 3 (composition of co-national employees - Hypothesis 3), Table 4 (alliance formation with 
co-national firms - Hypothesis 4), and Table 5 (imitation of technological trajectories - 
Hypothesis 5). In Table 6, I present an analysis of the moderators (Hypotheses 6-8).  
As robustness checks, I re-run all the analyses using different specifications. First, instead 
of the instrumental variable Poisson regression to control for the endogeneity, I use firm-
economic area fixed effects (Table 7). Second, instead of using economic areas as the geographic 
unit to illustrate agglomeration, I use U.S. states as the boundaries of agglomeration and re-run 
all the models using the instrumental variable Poisson regression approach (Table 8) and also 
using the fixed effects approach (Table 9). Finally, in Table 10, I use a larger sample of firms to 
re-run all the models, using economic areas as geographic boundaries and instrumental variables 
to account for endogeneity. 
Results suggest that agglomerating with more firms from the same home country indeed 
increases the number of patents but decreases the number of drug development in the focal 
location. The results also show support for some of the proposed mechanisms including 
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employee composition and imitation of technological trajectories. Moreover, I find support for 
the moderators that first mover firms, firms with more experience in the host country, and firms 
from individualistic cultures are less negatively impacted by agglomeration by nationality on 
their drug developments. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics with the bivariate correlations.  
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 around here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Trade-off of agglomeration by nationality on exploitative and explorative innovation 
 
Table 2 provides the results examining the trade-off that pharmaceutical firms face in 
foreign markets in terms of exploitative and explorative innovation. In Models 1-3, I test whether 
agglomerating with firms of the same nationality impacts the number of patents generated in the 
focal foreign market. Given that the degree of agglomeration may take a few years to have an 
impact on innovation performance, I use lag all the number of firms by 1 year, 2 years and 3 
years in Models 1, 2 and 3, respectively. In Model 1 and Model 2, both the number of co-
national pharmaceutical firms (0.29**, p < 0.01; p.17*, p <0.05) and the number of co-national 
firms in related areas (0.52**, p <0.01; 0.29*, p < 0.05) have a positive effect on the forward 1 
and 2-years patent count. The impact of the number of co-national firms in related areas is also 
positive and significant for the forward 3-years patent count (0.72***, p < 0.001), but the 
number of co-national pharmaceutical firms is not significant. These results provide support that 
co-locating with more firms of the same nationality has a positive impact on exploitative 
innovation as posited in Hypothesis 1. I also note that the number of other nationality firms all 
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have strong negative effects on the number of patents, suggesting that having more firms, in 
general, may increase competition and negatively impact exploitative innovation. 
To compare the impact of agglomeration by nationality on exploitative innovation to that 
on explorative innovation, I test whether the number of firms from the same home country has a 
different impact on new drug development in Models 4-6. The results provide support for 
Hypothesis 2. Using forward 3, 5, and 7-years count of new entity drug development as the 
dependent variable, both the number of co-national pharmaceutical firms (-0.13, p < 0.05; -1.18*, 
p < 0.05; -0.83*, p < 0.05) and the number of co-national firms in related industries (-0.27*, p < 
0.05; -0.81**, p < 0.01; -0.59**, p < 0.01) in the same economic area have a negative impact on 
the forward 3, 5, and 7-years number of drug developments.
9
 Taken together, the models 
presented in Table 2 provide strong support for the first two hypotheses and suggest that 
agglomeration by nationality positively impacts patent generation, a short-term exploitative 
innovation outcome, but negatively impacts new drug development, a long-term explorative 
innovation outcome. 
 
 
Mediation effects: Mechanisms that lead to the negative outcomes 
 
Having examined the trade-off of agglomeration by nationality on patenting (exploitative 
innovation) and drug development (explorative innovation), I next focus on the under-researched 
area of the negative effect on explorative innovation and explore mediators that may explain the 
negative consequences on explorative innovation. I use forward 5-year number of drug 
                                                   
9
 I also tried curvilinear specifications for the number of firms by including square terms for 
these numbers. However, I did not find significant results and therefore, do not include the 
square terms in the reported results. 
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developments as the dependent variable going forward. The results, however, are stable using 
both 3-year and 7-year cumulative number of drug developments.  
Model 7 in Table 3 provides a baseline model containing all the control variables for the 
instrumental variable Poisson regression on forward 5-year drug developments. It shows that 
having more co-national immigrants in the economic area has a positive and significant effect on 
drug developments. The results also show that more pharmaceutical firms that develop new 
entity drugs (other nationality) in the economic area the higher the number of drug developments 
indicating some evidence for positive effects from agglomeration, a distinct contrast from 
Models 1 to 3. However, co-locating with more firms in related areas does not affect drug 
development. All the moderators including being a first mover from a specific home country into 
the focal economic area, having more prior experience in the U.S. and coming from an 
individualistic culture have a positive and significant effect on new drug development. At the 
parent firm-level, cumulative drug development positively affects the drug development at the 
focal location. Moreover, a recent merger positively affects the number of drug developments 
suggesting that pharmaceutical firms may be acquiring other firms that are close to new drug 
developments.  
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 around here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
In Models 8, 9 and 10, I test the first proposed mechanism that higher proportion of same 
nationality employees will mediate the relationship between the number of same nationality 
firms and lower explorative innovation performance in the focal location as posited in 
Hypothesis 3. First, in Model 8, I add the main independent variables of the number of same 
nationality pharmaceutical firms developing new entity drugs and the number of same nationality 
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firms patenting in related areas providing evidence that agglomerating with same nationality 
firms has a negative impact on innovation performance. The coefficients indeed show that as the 
numbers of same nationality firms (both pharmaceutical firms and firms in related areas) 
increase, the forward 5-year drug development is significantly reduced (-1.18*, p < 0.05; -0.81**, 
p < 0.01). These negative main effects are significant across all models reported here. I also note 
that compared to Model 7, the positive and significant coefficient of the number of co-national 
immigrants is no longer significant in Model 8. To examine the mechanisms that mediate the 
main effect, I first focus on ethnic composition of inventors and regress the same set of variables 
on the number of co-national inventors. Second, in Model 9, I test whether the number of co-
national firms in the focal economic area affects the number of co-national inventors controlling 
for the total number of inventors in the focal location. Results show that co-locating with both a 
larger number of same nationality pharmaceutical firms and related firms increases the number 
of same nationality employees (0.31*, p < 0.05; 0.27**, p < 0.01). Finally, in Model 10, I 
include both the main independent variables and the mediator. The results show that the number 
of same nationality inventors has a significant negative effect on the number of forward 5-year 
drug developments (-1.26***, p < 0.001).The coefficients of the number of same nationality 
pharma firms and the number of same nationality related firms are reduced from -1.18 to -1.15, 
and from -0.81 to -0.59 respectively, but still remain significant, suggesting that the mediation 
effects are partial. 
Figure 2 clearly illustrates the mediation effect and provides support for Hypothesis 3. 
The results of the z-mediation test indicate that the number of same nationality inventors 
significantly mediates the relationship between the number of co-national pharmaceutical firms 
and the number of forward 5-year drug development (-1.68*, p < 0.05) and also the relationship 
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between the number of co-national firms in related areas and the number of forward 5-year drug 
developments (-2.54**, p < 0.01). 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 around here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 In Table 4, I test for the second proposed mechanism that forming more alliances with 
same nationality firms will mediate the relationship between agglomeration by nationality and 
drug development performance as posited in Hypothesis 4. Model 11 is a duplicate of Model 8 
presented only for the convenience of illustrating the mediation effect. In Model 12, I test 
whether the number of co-national pharmaceutical firms and related firms affect the nationality 
of alliances formed in the focal economic area. The results show that agglomerating with more 
co-national pharmaceutical firms and firms in related areas increases the likelihood of forming 
an alliance with other co-national firms in the co-located area (0.18**, p < 0.01; 0.13*, p < 0.05). 
Model 13, however, does not support Hypothesis 4 that forming more alliances with firms of the 
same nationality will lead to fewer number of future drug developments (-0.85, p > 0.10). The z-
mediation test illustrated in Figure 3 also does not provide evidence of a significant mediation 
effect (-0.49, p > 0.31; -0.73, p > 0.23).  
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 around here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 around here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
There are two potential reasons why I do not find support for Hypothesis 4. First, 
empirically, I was not able to comprehensively assign each alliance to a specific location. Most 
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alliance announcements are made at a national-level or a general-level without specifying the 
specific location in which the alliances. By searching the detailed announcement for each 
alliance, I tried to fully identify the region where the alliances originated but could not find 
comprehensive information for many of the observations. For the alliance that I could not assign 
to a specific economic area, I assigned them to specific locations when all relevant firms in the 
alliance located in the same economic area at the time of alliance announcement. This method, 
however, may be misidentifying the origin of the alliance and thus, attributing to non-
significance of the mediation tests. Second, alliances which are relationships between firms, and 
hiring of employees which is a relationship between an organization and an individual, could 
represent two different types of relationships that are theoretically dissimilar. I further discuss the 
potential theoretical dissimilarities and future directions in the conclusion section of this 
dissertation.  
In Table 5, I test the third proposed mediation (Hypothesis 5) that the imitation of 
technological trajectories among same nationality firms is another pathway by which 
agglomeration by nationality leads to lower explorative innovation performance. Model 14 is a 
duplicate of Model 8 presented only for the convenience of illustrating the mediation effect. 
Model 15 indicates that agglomerating with more same nationality pharmaceutical firms and 
firms in related areas increases the likelihood that the focal firm imitates the patenting strategy of 
same nationality firms (0.83*, p < 0.05; 0.16*, p < 0.05). Model 16 includes both the mediator 
(imitation ratio) and the main effects (number of co-national pharmaceutical firms and firms in 
related areas) as well as all the control variables. Higher imitation ratio of the same nationality 
firms decreases the number of future drug developments (-0.23*, p < 0.05). In addition, the 
coefficients of the number of same nationality pharmaceutical firms and the number of same 
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nationality related firms are -1.13 and -0.77, respectively, which are smaller than in Model 14 
without the mediating variable. The main effects, however, still remain statistically significant. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 around here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Figure 4 clearly illustrates the mediation effect and provides support for Hypothesis 5. 
The results of the z-mediation test indicate that the imitation of the technological trajectories of 
co-national firms significantly mediates the relationship between the number of co-national 
pharmaceutical firms and the number of forward 5-year drug development (-1.74*, p < 0.05) and 
also the relationship between the number of co-national firms in related areas and the number of 
forward 5-year drug developments (-1.42†, p < 0.10). 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 around here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 Finally, Model 17 of Table 5 presents a full model including all the mediators. The 
coefficients show similar patterns to the previous results and the meditation tests are also robust 
using the results of the full model. The main negative effect is reduced but still significant in the 
full model, suggesting that there may be other potential mediators that explain the main effect. I 
further discuss this issue in the conclusion. 
  
 
Moderation effects: Boundary conditions 
 
Having examined the main effect and the mediation effects, I next turn to the moderators 
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posited in Hypotheses 6-8 and explore the boundary conditions of the negative impact of 
agglomeration by nationality on explorative innovation. First, in Model 18, I add the interactions 
of the number of co-national pharmaceutical firms and the number of co-national firms in related 
areas by the entry sequence focal firm into the focal economic area by home country. Following 
the logic in Hypothesis 6, I expected a negative coefficient which would indicate that the 
negative impact of agglomeration by nationality is accentuated for firms that are followers 
whereas the negative impact is attenuated for firms that are early movers. The results show that 
the interaction between the number of co-national pharmaceutical firms by the entry sequence   
(-0.33**, p < 0.01) supports Hypothesis 6 but the interaction between number of co-national 
firms in related areas by the entry sequence is not statistically significant (0.21, p > 0.10). In 
other words, the negative impact of co-locating with more co-national pharmaceutical firms on 
drug development is reduced for firms that were the ones to enter the focal location before other 
firms from the same home country. However, the impact of co-locating with co-national firms in 
related industries is not affected by the entry sequence.  
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 around here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Second, I examine the moderating effect of prior experience in the host country on the 
relationship between co-locating with co-national firms and explorative innovation as posited in 
Hypothesis 7. In Model 19, I add the interactions of the number of co-national pharmaceutical 
firms and the number of co-national firms in related areas by the prior experience of the focal 
firm in other locations in the U.S. prior to entering the focal economic area. As argued in 
Hypothesis 7, I expected a positive coefficient which would indicate that the negative impact of 
agglomeration by nationality is attenuated for firms that have more experience in the host 
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country. The results support Hypothesis 7 and show that the interaction between the number of 
co-national pharmaceutical firms by prior experience (2.59**, p < 0.01) and the interaction 
between number of co-national firms in related areas by prior experience (0.83**, p < 0.01) are 
both statistically significant in the predicted direction. In other words, the negative impacts of co-
locating with more co-national pharmaceutical firms and with more co-national firms in related 
areas on drug development are reduced for firms that have more experience in entering other 
locations in the U.S. before entering the focal economic area. 
Finally, I examine the moderating effect of the individualistic (as opposed to 
collectivistic) culture of the home country on the relationship between co-locating with co-
national firms and explorative innovation as posited in Hypothesis 8. In Model 20, I add the 
interactions of the number of co-national pharmaceutical firms and the number of co-national 
firms in related areas by the individualism score of the firm’s home country culture. Following 
the argument previously laid out in Hypothesis 8, I expected a positive coefficient which would 
indicate that the negative impact of agglomeration by nationality is attenuated for firms that are 
from a more individualistic culture whereas the negative impact will be magnified for those from 
collectivistic cultures. The results support Hypothesis 8 and show that the interaction between 
the number of co-national pharmaceutical firms by the individualism score (0.12**, p < 0.01) 
and the interaction between number of co-national firms in related areas by the individualism 
score (0.05*, p < 0.05) are both statistically significant in the predicted direction. In other words, 
the negative impacts of co-locating with more co-national pharmaceutical firms and with more 
co-national firms in related areas on drug development are reduced for firms that are from 
individualistic home countries. 
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To summarize, the results provide evidence that support the main argument in 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 that pharmaceutical firms face a trade-off between patent generation 
(exploitative innovation) and drug development (explorative innovation) when they are co-
located with more firms with the same nationality. Agglomeration by nationality increases the 
number of patents generated in the focal economic area whereas it decreases the number of drug 
developments. Next, the mediation analyses provide support for Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 5 
but not Hypothesis 4. The results show that having a larger composition of co-national inventors 
and imitating the technological trajectories of co-national firms mediate the negative relationship 
between agglomeration by nationality and the number of future drug developments in a focal 
economic area. Finally, the results provide evidence that support Hypotheses 6 to Hypotheses 8: 
The negative impact of agglomeration by nationality on explorative innovation is attenuated for 
firms that are first movers to the focal location from their home country, firms that have more 
experience in the host country and firms from home countries that have an individualistic 
culture.  
 
 
Robustness Checks 
 
 To check the stability of the previous results, I conduct various robustness checks using 
difference specifications. First, in Table 7, instead of the instrumental variable Poisson 
regression to control for the endogeneity, I use firm-economic area fixed effects. The results 
presented in Table 7 show similar patterns to the previous results. Model 7a to Model 20a 
correspond to Model 7 to Model 20 in the tables presented above (Model 11a and Model 13a are 
69 
 
missing since they are identical to Model 8a). Model 8a supports Hypothesis 2 that co-locating 
with more firms of the same nationality, both pharmaceutical competitors and related firms, 
leads to lower number of drug developments. Models 9a and 10a provide additional support for 
Hypothesis 3 that having more inventors of the same nationality mediates the negative outcome. 
Similar to prior results, Models 12a and 13a do not show support for Hypothesis 4 which posited 
that forming more co-national alliances will also mediate the negative impact of agglomeration 
by nationality. Furthermore, Models 15a and 16a provide evidence that support Hypothesis 5 and 
shows that imitation of technological trajectories of co-national firms is another mechanism by 
which agglomeration by nationality leads to lower explorative innovation performance. Finally, 
Models 18a, 19a, and 20a test the significance of the moderating effects. The results show the 
same patterns as Models 18, 19 and 20: Firms that have more prior experience in the U.S. and 
firms from individualistic cultures are less negatively affected by co-locating with co-national 
firms in terms of drug development, supporting Hypotheses 7 and 8. Hypothesis 6 is partially 
supported: Being a first mover as opposed to a follower moderates the impact of co-locating with 
more co-national pharmaceutical firms on future drug development but not the impact of co-
locating with more co-national firms in related industries. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 around here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Next, in Table 8 and Table 9, instead of using economic areas as the geographic unit to 
illustrate agglomeration, I use U.S. states as the boundaries of agglomeration and re-run all the 
models. I use the instrumental variable Poisson regression approach in Table 8 and the fixed 
effects approach in Table 9. Model 7b/c to Model 20b/c correspond to Model 7 to Model 20 in 
the tables presented above (Model 11b/c and Model 13b/c are missing since they are identical to 
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Model 8b/c). Models 8b and 8c both show support for Hypothesis 2 that co-locating with more 
firms of the same nationality in the focal U.S. state has a negative impact on future drug 
developments. Models 9 b/c to 16 b/c that test for the mediations show the same patterns as the 
previous results: The models support Hypothesis 3 and 5 but not Hypothesis 4. Having more 
inventors of the same nationality and following the technological trajectories of the co-national 
firms mediate the relationship between agglomeration by nationality and lower future drug 
development. Finally, the tests of moderations in Models 18 b/c to 20 b/c show similar results as 
to those presented above and support Hypotheses 6 to 8 that firms that are followers, firms with 
less experience in the U.S. and firms from collectivistic cultures are more negatively affected by 
co-locating with more firms of the same nationality in terms of long-term drug development in 
the foreign market. 
 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 around here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 around here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Finally, in Table 10, instead of using the main sample of 80 pharmaceutical firms, I use a 
larger sample of firms to test the hypotheses. By using the main 80 pharmaceutical firms as the 
sample, I follow the approach of other research on pharmaceutical firms that only examines 
firms that have developed at least one new entity drug (Fabrizio and Thomas, 2012) and research 
on firms in other industries such as studies that examine investment banks that have participated 
at least once in underwriting activities (Podolny, 1993; Jensen, 2003). Nevertheless, I may be 
omitting the pharmaceutical firms that have tried to develop new entity drugs but did not succeed 
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during the period of 1980-2006. Given that I am interested in firms that are in the competition for 
explorative innovation, I would, ideally, like to get the list of all the firms that have tried to 
develop new entity drugs regardless of their success to do so. However, given the limited amount 
of information on the failed attempts to develop new drugs, I am only able to identify those that 
have succeeded in developing at least one drug (my main sample) or those that have patented in 
pharmaceutical or related areas (my alternative sample). Using the latter sample may result in 
noisy estimations given that a majority of these firms are not attempting to develop new drugs. 
Nevertheless, as another robustness check, I tried using the entire latter sample of 1,100 firms to 
test the hypotheses. However, excluding the 80 firms from the main sample, most of these firms 
have never developed a new entity drug, making the dependent variable zero in most of the 
cases. The models, as a result, did not converge. As an alternative approach, I added random 
sample of 80 firms from the 1,100 to the main sample of 80 firms and re-ran the analyses using 
160 firms. 
Table 10 presents the results using 80 firms from the main sample and 80 firms from the 
alternative sample. I used economic areas as the geographic unit of analysis and the instrumental 
variable Poisson regression to control for endogeneity issues. The results largely show similar 
patterns, but weaker in significance, to the prior results using just the main sample. Model 8d 
shows that the number of co-national firms (both pharmaceutical and related) has a negative 
impact on future number of drug developments. Of the three proposed mechanisms, only the 
number of co-national inventors was a significant mediator (see Models 9d and 10d) whereas the 
number of co-national alliances and the imitation of technological trajectories did not mediate 
the relationship between agglomeration by nationality and the number of drug developments. 
The moderators were significant in the predicted directions only for the number of co-national 
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pharmaceutical firms: The negative impact of co-locating with same nationality pharmaceutical 
firms on future drug developments are attenuated for first mover firms, firms with more 
experience in the U.S. and firms from individualistic cultures. The moderation effects for the 
number of co-national firms in related areas are not support in Models 19d and 20d, and the 
impact is significant in the opposite direction in Model 17d. Although the results in Table 10 are 
largely similar to prior analyses, the insignificance of some of the mediators and moderators 
suggest caution to the generalization of the arguments. In other words, the theoretical arguments 
regarding the behavioral mechanisms and the boundary conditions may not apply to firms that do 
not invest in or put less emphasis on explorative innovation.  
 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 around here 
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In sum, the empirical analysis in the global pharmaceutical industry show support for 
most of the theoretical arguments. First, the results show evidence that agglomerating with more 
co-national firms have a positive impact on patent generation while having a negative impact on 
drug developments. This supports Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 that firms face a trade-off in 
exploitative and explorative innovation when agglomerating by nationality. Second, the results 
show support for two of the three proposed behavioral mechanisms that explain the negative 
impact on explorative innovation. I find that having a higher composition of co-national 
inventors and imitating the technological trajectories of co-national firms mediate the 
relationship between the number of co-national firms and the number of drug developments. 
Finally, the results show support for three moderators. I find that the negative impact of 
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agglomeration by nationality is attenuated for firms that are early movers from the home country, 
firms that have prior experience in the host country, and firms that are from individualistic 
cultures.  
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CHAPTER FIVE. CONCLUSION 
 
This study focused on nationality as a key aspect of firm identity and specifically 
examined how agglomeration by nationality can impact innovation performance of firms 
conducting R&D in foreign markets. While agglomeration by nationality has been shown to 
benefit firms entering foreign markets, it can also lead to homophilic relationships and imitative 
strategic decisions, restricting the diversity of information channels and limiting new knowledge 
flows. I argued therefore that for firms that enter foreign markets to conduct R&D, 
agglomerating with firms of the same nationality has a trade-off on innovation performance in 
that there are benefits in terms of exploitative innovation but can hinder explorative innovation. 
Contrasting with prior research that focused mostly on the benefits of agglomeration by 
nationality, I focused on the negative impact on explorative innovation and identified the 
important role of national identity in influencing firm behavior such as relationship formation 
and strategic imitation that account for the pathways by which agglomeration by nationality can 
lead to negative outcomes. I specifically argued that i) higher composition of employees of the 
same nationality, ii) more alliance formation among firms of the same nationality, and iii) 
imitation of technological trajectories of firms of the same nationality will lead to redundant 
knowledge and reduced flexibility and thus, lower the explorative innovation performance in the 
foreign market. Moreover, I explored the boundary conditions of these arguments by examining 
firm-level characteristics that impact the degree to which firms are negatively affected by 
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agglomerating with co-national firms. Specifically, I argued that first or early movers from the 
home country, firms with more prior experience in the host country, and firms from 
individualistic cultures are less negatively affected by co-locating with other firms from the same 
home country. 
 I used a sample of non-U.S. pharmaceutical firms conducting R&D in the U.S. to test the 
theoretical arguments. Results largely confirmed the theoretical arguments: First, the results 
showed that co-locating with more firms from the same home country leads to an increase in the 
number of patents generated in the focal foreign location but a decrease in the number of drug 
developments, illustrating a trade-off in terms of exploitative and explorative innovation 
outcomes. Second, the results also showed support for two of the proposed behavioral 
mechanisms: Having higher composition of same nationality employees and imitation of 
technological trajectories mediate the impact of agglomeration by nationality on innovation 
performance. Third, the empirical analyses show evidence that certain firms are able to resist the 
magnetic pull from national identity and are less negatively affected. More specifically, I find 
that early movers from the home country, more experienced firms and firms from individualistic 
cultures are less affected by agglomeration by nationality in terms of their drug development 
performance in the foreign market. 
 
 
Contributions 
 
By studying the process and the consequences of agglomeration by nationality in foreign 
markets, this dissertation offers important theoretical contributions in several areas. First, this 
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study contributes to research on agglomeration. Prior research on agglomeration has well 
documented the positive and negative externalities of agglomeration (Marshall, 1920; McCann 
and Folta, 2008). Studies have especially emphasized that agglomeration, in general, facilitates 
innovation but also that negative externalities arise from excessive competition among firms that 
locate in geographically proximate locations (Baum and Mezias, 1992; Baum and Haveman, 
1997). This study, by focusing on the important role of organizational identity, identifies another 
important source of negative externality of agglomeration and shows that under certain 
conditions, agglomeration can hinder rather than facilitate innovation. While prior research has 
mostly focused on the competitive dynamics within agglomerated clusters, I argue that when a 
subset of actors that share an identity agglomerate, shared identity functions as a magnet and 
promotes certain behavioral tendencies which leads to negative performance outcomes. Using 
nationality as a salient indicator of shared identity of firms in a foreign market, I theorize that 
firms of the same nationality are more likely to interact in a cooperative manner, rather than 
intensely compete with each other, in a foreign market and consequently become embedded in a 
social structure by nationality, restricting them from a diverse set of connections. Specifically, I 
propose that when firms that share the same nationality agglomerate, they will initially form 
more relationships with actors of the same nationality and imitate one another’s strategies which 
can consequently lead to negative explorative innovation outcomes.  
Second, I contribute to the literature on identity by emphasizing the function of shared 
identity as a magnetic force and showing that shared identity can lead to significant outcomes for 
organizations. Research has well-documented the phenomenon of homophily or the tendency of 
actors that share an identity to form relationships (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001; 
Reagans, 2005; Ingram and Morris, 2007). My study builds on this stream of work and shows 
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that homophily at the individual level can aggregate up to the organizational level and generate 
unintended outcomes. Furthermore, I go beyond the function of shared identity to stimulate 
homogenous relationships and show that shared identity can also influence strategic decision 
making in firms. More specifically, I suggest that shared identity can function as a magnetic 
force that aligns behavior of actors that share similar identities and thus, increase the likelihood 
that these actors imitate one another’s strategic decisions. In sum, by focusing on the role of 
national identity in foreign markets, I illustrate a specific example of how identity can lead to 
unintended but significant negative consequences by acting as a magnet and governing behavior 
such as promoting homophilic relationships and influencing strategic decisions.  
Third, my study contributes to the research on foreign market entry by theorizing the 
processes that occur after entry. Prior research on foreign market entry has highlighted the 
imitative behavior of other firms from the same home country when choosing locations in 
foreign markets (Henisz and Delios, 2001; Guillén, 2002). I shift the attention from the entry 
stage and focus on firm behavior and performance after the initial entry to show the 
consequences of agglomerating by nationality. Tracing the processes throughout multiple stages 
of firms’ foreign expansion is important given that the factors that contribute to location choice 
decisions may not always lead to the intended outcomes in terms of long term performance in the 
market. Finally, this study contributes to research on the agglomeration of actors by 
ethnicity/nationality. Most research on agglomeration by nationality have focused on individuals 
and ethnic enclaves (Portes, 2010) and highlighted the benefits of agglomeration by nationality 
in foreign markets. The few studies at the organizational level have also emphasized the initial 
benefits such as ease of communication and information sharing. This study shifts attention from 
the short-run positive consequences of agglomeration to the long-run negative consequences, 
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thus highlighting an important trade-off between ease of market entry and long-run 
competitiveness in foreign markets. I certainly do not suggest that agglomeration by nationality 
or homophily do not have benefits but emphasize instead the importance of a long-term 
perspective in location choice. 
My dissertation has important implications for managers and policy makers as well. This 
study provides insights for firms with foreign operations, especially those with international 
R&D facilities, on where to locate in foreign markets to maximize their benefits. As knowledge 
seeking foreign expansion is increasingly becoming more prevalent, choosing the location to 
take advantage of innovation opportunities in foreign markets has become a key issue for 
multinational firms. Foreign market entry decisions are particularly important in the 
pharmaceutical industry where the trend in the industry is that not only pharmaceutical firms 
from developed countries but also those from emerging economies are moving away from 
simply producing generics to investing towards research and development of new molecules and 
choosing multiple locations worldwide to locate new facilities. This study suggests that 
agglomerating with other firms from the same home country, while beneficial for certain types of 
innovations, may not be the best decision for obtaining new and distant knowledge and 
producing new explorative innovations. If firms nevertheless decide to agglomerate in foreign 
markets, my analyses of the behavioral mechanisms accounting for the negative effects of 
aggregation point to important counter measures: benchmark foreign firms, partner with foreign 
firms, and hire foreign talent.  
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Limitations and Future Research 
 
Although the findings largely support the theoretical arguments, this study has limitations 
that should be addressed in future research. First, although I found support for two of the three 
proposed mechanisms, I did not find empirical evidence in support of Hypothesis 4 which argued 
that forming more alliances with co-national firms will mediate the relationship between 
agglomeration by nationality and lower explorative innovation performance. The non-
significance of the result may be due to the data limitation and not being able to accurately 
identify the geographic origin of alliances as discussed above. Another possibility is that alliance 
decisions are fundamentally different from hiring decisions. Alliances may be determined at the 
parent firm-level than at the subsidiary and therefore, less influenced by the business 
environment in the foreign location. Given that the negative main effect still remained significant 
with all the proposed mediators included in the models, a further investigation into other 
potential mediators including a comprehensive examination of the alliance formation mechanism 
is required in future research.  
Second, due to data limitations, I was not able to distinguish between the employees that 
were hired in the foreign location from those that moved from the parent firm in the home 
country to the subsidiary in the host country. I was also not able to distinguish just from the 
name of the employee whether she actually possesses the cultural characteristics associated with 
the nationality of the name or she has a completely different cultural background. Being able to 
more accurately measure the cultural background of each employee will give a more nuanced 
understanding of the internal dynamics within a firm as well the interfirm dynamics.  Finally, 
although I explored behavior mechanisms to explain the negative consequences of agglomeration 
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by nationality, future research should go even deeper and examine the micro mechanisms 
underlying the outcomes at the organization level. For example, by exploring the actual social 
networks of the expatriates in foreign markets, future research will be able to better identify the 
relationships between the expatriates and explore how the individual level social relationships 
affect business strategies at the organizational level.  
 
In sum, my study suggests that firms may face a trade-off in their exploitative and 
explorative innovation outcomes by co-locating with other firms with the same national identity 
in foreign markets. I argue that national identity is a magnetic force that promotes relationships 
and aligns strategies between co-national actors which, in turn, leads to negative outcomes in 
terms of explorative innovation. I also provide boundary conditions to the argument by showing 
that certain firm characteristics attenuate the negative impact of agglomeration by nationality. 
Overall, despite its limitation, I believe that my dissertation provides valuable insights to the 
understanding of the role of national identity of firms in foreign markets.   
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FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1.  
Summary of Hypotheses 
Agglomeration by 
nationality
Exploitative innovation 
(H1)
(+)
Explorative innovation 
(H2)
(‒)
Agglomeration by 
nationality
Explorative innovation
(-)
Mediators: Behavioral mechanisms
• Higher composition of employees of same
nationality (H3) 
• Alliance formation with firms of same
nationality (H4)
• Imitation of strategies of firms of same
nationality (H5)
(+) (-)
Moderators: Firm characteristics
•First mover among firms of same nationality (H6) 
•Prior experience in host country (H7)
•Firms from home countries with 
individualistic cultures (H8)
(-)
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TABLES  
TABLE 1.  
Summary Statistics and Bivariate Correlations 
1A. Analysis on Number of Patents
Mean S. D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1. Number of Patents 3.56 12.41
2. Same Nationality Firms (Related) 1.82 0.96 0.02
3. Same Nationality Firms (Pharma) 1.12 0.39 0.20 0.11
4. Same Nationality Immigrants 6.11 1.86 0.09 0.08 0.20
5. Other Nationality Firms (Related) 2.93 0.79 -0.04 0.37 0.07 -0.06
6. Other Nationality Firms (Pharma) 1.69 1.44 0.18 0.35 0.47 0.12 0.36
7. Entry Sequence (by Nationality) 2.27 1.57 0.04 0.37 0.40 -0.08 0.32 0.32
8. Prior Experience (# of Prior US Entries) 2.45 0.88 0.05 0.11 -0.04 -0.08 0.07 -0.10 -0.04
9. Individualism (Hofstede score) 4.44 0.18 0.01 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.06 0.10 0.15 -0.14
10. Total Inventors 0.76 1.53 0.31 0.03 0.21 0.09 0.05 0.27 0.05 0.15 -0.14
11. Total Alliances 0.06 0.25 0.19 0.12 0.14 0.07 0.06 0.18 0.11 0.09 -0.07 0.39
12. Total Patents by Same Nationality Firms 1.01 1.47 0.28 0.12 0.34 0.15 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.07 -0.09 0.43 0.32
13. Self Imitation Ratio 0.55 1.17 0.19 0.18 0.25 0.02 0.18 0.27 0.22 0.18 -0.06 0.45 0.28 0.44
14. Other Nationality Imitation Ratio 1.07 1.88 0.30 0.17 0.35 0.14 0.17 0.37 0.15 0.08 -0.10 0.40 0.35 0.45 0.45
15. Cumulative Patents 4.23 2.41 0.24 0.05 0.28 -0.12 0.08 0.28 0.24 0.03 0.01 0.24 0.14 0.17 0.29 0.22
16. Merger Year +5 (1, 0) 0.21 0.41 0.09 0.27 0.07 -0.11 0.30 0.14 0.31 0.21 0.04 0.22 0.26 0.15 0.25 0.22 0.24
17. R&D Workforce 1.60 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.29 0.06 0.09 0.32 0.22 -0.01 0.13 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.04
1B. Analysis on Drug Developments 
Mean S. D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1. Forward 5-year Drug Development 0.58 0.67
2. Same Nationality Firms (Related) 1.89 0.88 -0.02
3. Same Nationality Firms (Pharma) 1.13 0.39 0.24 0.12
4. Same Nationality Inventors 0.37 0.94 0.14 0.09 0.22
5. Same Nationality Alliances 0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.07 0.13 0.15
6. Same Nationality Firm Imitation Ratio 0.74 1.48 0.05 0.11 0.34 0.28 0.12
7. Same Nationality Immigrants 6.02 1.87 -0.05 0.07 0.22 0.08 0.09 0.13
8. Other Nationality Firms (Related) 2.96 0.78 -0.03 0.46 0.06 0.07 -0.05 0.05 -0.07
9. Other Nationality Firms (Pharma) 1.83 1.43 0.20 0.36 0.47 0.20 0.09 0.32 0.10 0.36
10. Entry Sequence (by Nationality) 2.34 1.62 0.16 0.35 0.48 0.06 0.05 0.16 -0.07 0.30 0.41
11. Prior Experience (# of Prior US Entries) 2.53 0.86 -0.02 0.13 -0.03 0.16 0.10 -0.03 -0.09 0.10 -0.08 -0.04
12. Individualism (Hofstede score) 4.26 2.23 0.02 0.10 0.13 -0.11 -0.07 -0.03 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.21 -0.15
13. Total Inventors 0.71 1.49 0.17 0.04 0.20 0.43 0.18 0.25 0.09 0.02 0.25 0.02 0.13 -0.14
14. Total Alliances 0.06 0.25 0.15 0.09 0.13 0.36 0.44 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.17 0.06 0.10 -0.09 0.40
15. Total Patents by Same Nationality Firms 0.96 1.43 0.14 0.13 0.33 0.49 0.14 0.34 0.17 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.06 -0.09 0.31 0.31
16. Self Imitation Ratio 0.54 1.15 0.18 0.16 0.25 0.49 0.12 0.22 0.04 0.13 0.26 0.19 0.17 -0.07 0.45 0.27 0.44
17. Other Nationality Imitation Ratio 1.02 1.83 0.15 0.17 0.33 0.38 0.15 0.35 0.14 0.14 0.36 0.11 0.08 -0.10 0.49 0.34 0.44 0.44
18. Cumulative Drug Developments 0.14 0.42 0.45 0.07 0.27 0.19 0.00 0.08 -0.12 0.07 0.28 0.23 0.04 0.02 0.20 0.13 0.14 0.25 0.19
19. Merger Year +5 (1, 0) 0.25 0.43 0.12 0.27 0.03 0.24 0.10 0.05 -0.09 0.29 0.12 0.20 0.26 0.02 0.20 0.23 0.13 0.20 0.18 0.20
20. R&D Workforce 1.60 0.15 0.07 0.04 0.28 -0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.32 0.23 -0.02 0.11 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.04
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TABLE 2.  
IV Poisson Regression Results on the Trade-off of Agglomeration by Nationality on Exploitative 
and Explorative Innovation 
  
Number of Firms 
Lagged 1 Year
Number of Firms 
Lagged 2 Years
Number of Firms 
Lagged 3 Years
Forward 3-years 
Number of Drug 
Developments
Forward 5-years 
Number of Drug 
Developments
Forward 7-years 
Number of Drug 
Developments
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Firm-Economic Area Level
Same Nationality Firms (Related) 0.52** 0.29* 0.72*** -0.27* -0.81** -0.59**
(0.17) (0.19) (0.21) (0.10) (0.30) (0.21)
Same Nationality Firms (Pharma) 0.29** 0.17* 0.08 -0.13* -1.18* -0.83*
(0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.50) (0.47) (0.38)
Same Nationality Immigrants 0.05 0.11* 0.11† 0.21 0.32 0.35†
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.18) (0.17) (0.20)
Other Nationality Firms (Related) -0.59*** -0.50*** -0.44*** 0.01* -0.18 0.13
(0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.00) (0.12) (0.07)
Other Nationality Firms (Pharma) -0.54*** -0.58*** -0.68*** 0.09*** 1.08*** 1.11***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.01) (0.30) (0.31)
Entry Sequence (by Nationality) 0.25*** 0.40*** 0.58*** 0.21† 0.24* 0.31*
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13)
Prior Experience (# of Prior US Entries) 0.05 -0.18* -0.15† 0.80** 0.85** 0.63*
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.31) (0.29) (0.27)
Individualism (Hofstede score) 0.36 0.34 0.27 0.09** 0.10** 0.12**
(0.27) (0.26) (0.17) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Total Inventors 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.37*** 0.18 0.25 0.31
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.15) (0.21)
Total Alliances -0.09 -0.17 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.13
(0.17) (0.23) (0.24) (0.06) (0.43) (0.08)
Total Patents by Same Nationality Firms 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.21 0.19 0.25
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16)
Self Imitation Ratio 0.00 0.12* 0.02 0.01 -0.21† -0.30†
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.01) (0.12) (0.13)
Other Nationality Imitation Ratio 0.02 0.07 0.03 -0.11 -0.08 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.01)
Firm Level
Cumulative Patents / Drug Developments 0.80*** 0.61*** 0.72*** 1.71*** 2.02*** 2.71***
(0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.05) (0.23) (0.39)
Merger Year +5 (1, 0) 0.41** 0.07 -0.04 0.57† 0.66† 0.79*
(0.16) (0.17) (0.19) (0.24) (0.40) (0.34)
Economic Area Level
R&D Workforce in State 1.60*** 1.73*** 2.00*** 1.87† 1.73 2.30
(0.46) (0.52) (0.53) (0.89) (2.10) (1.23)
Constant -7.87*** -9.84*** -12.74*** -18.92*** -22.69*** -46.98***
(1.12) (1.36) (1.59) (3.87) (4.44) (5.12)
Observations 2,289 2,112 1,926 2,689 2,394 2,157
Parent firm fixed effects included.
DV: Number of Patents DV: Number of New Drug Developments
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10
87 
 
TABLE 3.  
Mediation Analysis: Composition of Co-National Inventors (n=2,394) 
  
Forward 5-year Drug 
Development
Forward 5-year Drug 
Development
Number of Co-
National Inventors (ln)
Forward 5-year Drug 
Development
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Same Nationality Inventors -1.26***
(0.32)
Same Nationality Firms (Related) -0.81** 0.27** -0.59*
(0.30) (0.08) (0.30)
Same Nationality Firms (Pharma) -1.18* 0.31* -1.15*
(0.47) (0.17) (0.60)
Firm-Economic Area Level
Same Nationality Immigrants 0.38*** 0.32 -0.05 0.25
(0.09) (0.17) (0.07) (0.15)
Other Nationality Firms (Related) -0.42 -0.18 0.07 -0.13
(0.31) (0.12) (0.10) (0.14)
Other Nationality Firms (Pharma) 1.22*** 1.08*** -0.08 0.69*
(0.29) (0.30) (0.08) (0.27)
Entry Sequence (by Nationality) 0.16* 0.24* 0.01† 0.30**
(0.08) (0.11) (0.01) (0.11)
Prior Experience (# of Prior US Entries) 0.57* 0.85** 0.04 0.62*
(0.26) (0.29) (0.03) (0.30)
Individualism (Hofstede score) 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.00 0.10***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02)
Total Inventors 0.28† 0.25 0.54*** 0.78***
(0.14) (0.15) (0.02) (0.23)
Total Alliances 0.07 0.14 -0.06 0.21
(0.42) (0.43) (0.05) (0.40)
Total Patents by Same Nationality Firms 0.19 0.19 0.02* 0.28†
(0.13) (0.13) (0.01) (0.15)
Self Imitation Ratio -0.10 -0.21† 0.05*** -0.05
(0.12) (0.12) (0.01) (0.11)
Other Nationality Imitation Ratio -0.05 -0.08 0.03** -0.09
(0.09) (0.09) (0.01) (0.09)
Firm Level
Cumulative Drug Developments 2.28*** 2.02*** -0.02 2.08***
(0.25) (0.23) (0.02) (0.25)
Merger Year +5 (1, 0) 0.94* 0.66† 0.07* 0.79*
(0.42) (0.40) (0.03) (0.38)
Economic Area Level
R&D Workforce 2.44 1.73 0.03 1.56
(2.07) (2.10) (0.14) (1.81)
Constant -22.69*** -0.38 -23.05***
(4.44) (0.48) (4.55)
Parent firm fixed effects included.
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10
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TABLE 4.  
Mediation Analysis: Co-National Alliance Formation (n=2,394) 
Forward 5-year Drug 
Development
Number of Same 
Nationality Alliances
Forward 5-year Drug 
Development
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
Same Nationality Alliances -0.85
(1.60)
Same Nationality Firms (Related) -0.81** 0.13* -0.79**
(0.30) (0.09) (0.24)
Same Nationality Firms (Pharma) -1.18* 0.18** -1.19*
(0.47) (0.07) (0.47)
Firm-Economic Area Level
Same Nationality Immigrants 0.32 0.02 0.31
(0.17) (0.02) (0.17)
Other Nationality Firms (Related) -0.18 -0.05 -0.18
(0.12) (0.03) (0.12)
Other Nationality Firms (Pharma) 1.08*** -0.04 1.08***
(0.30) (0.03) (0.29)
Entry Sequence (by Nationality) 0.24* 0.00 0.25*
(0.11) (0.00) (0.11)
Prior Experience (# of Prior US Entries) 0.85** 0.00 0.86**
(0.29) (0.01) (0.29)
Individualism (Hofstede score) 0.10*** 0.00 0.10***
(0.03) (0.00) (0.02)
Total Inventors 0.25 0.01 0.25
(0.15) (0.01) (0.15)
Total Alliances 0.14 0.15*** 0.23
(0.43) (0.02) (0.44)
Total Patents by Same Nationality Firms 0.19 0.00 0.19
(0.13) (0.00) (0.13)
Self Imitation Ratio -0.21† 0.00 -0.20†
(0.12) (0.00) (0.12)
Other Nationality Imitation Ratio -0.08 -0.01 -0.08
(0.09) (0.00) (0.09)
Firm Level
Cumulative Drug Developments 2.02*** -0.01 2.00***
(0.23) (0.01) (0.23)
Merger Year +5 (1, 0) 0.66† 0.01 0.63
(0.40) (0.01) (0.40)
Economic Area Level
R&D Workforce 1.73 0.05 1.78
(2.10) (0.05) (2.11)
Constant -22.69*** 0.16 -22.58***
(4.44) (0.16) (4.55)
Parent firm fixed effects included.
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10
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Forward 5-year Drug 
Development
Same Nationality Firm 
Imitation Ratio
Forward 5-year Drug 
Development
Forward 5-year Drug 
Development
Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17
Same Nationality Firm Imitation Ratio -0.23* -0.19*
(0.11) (0.10)
Same Nationality Alliances -1.54
(1.61)
Same Nationality Inventors -1.09**
(0.33)
Same Nationality Firms (Related) -0.81** 0.16* -0.77* -0.54†
(0.30) (0.08) (0.30) (0.30)
Same Nationality Firms (Pharma) -1.18* 0.83* -1.13* -1.04*
(0.47) (0.24) (0.37) (0.50)
Firm-Economic Area Level
Same Nationality Immigrants 0.32 0.16 0.24 0.20
(0.17) (0.28) (0.17) (0.15)
Other Nationality Firms (Related) -0.18 -0.07 -0.18 -0.16
(0.12) (0.40) (0.12) (0.14)
Other Nationality Firms (Pharma) 1.08*** 0.39 1.11*** 0.76**
(0.30) (0.32) (0.30) (0.28)
Entry Sequence (by Nationality) 0.24* 0.05 0.28* 0.32**
(0.11) (0.05) (0.11) (0.12)
Prior Experience (# of Prior US Entries) 0.85** 0.17 0.86** 0.67*
(0.29) (0.11) (0.29) (0.30)
Individualism (Hofstede score) 0.10*** 0.00 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Total Inventors 0.25 -0.06 0.19 0.70**
(0.15) (0.07) (0.15) (0.23)
Total Alliances 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.27
(0.43) (0.22) (0.43) (0.42)
Total Patents by Same Nationality Firms 0.19 0.13** 0.19 0.25†
(0.13) (0.04) (0.13) (0.14)
Self Imitation Ratio -0.21† 0.05 -0.21† -0.08
(0.12) (0.03) (0.12) (0.11)
Other Nationality Imitation Ratio -0.08 0.15** 0.00 -0.02
(0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10)
Firm Level
Cumulative Drug Developments 2.02*** -0.21* 2.04*** 2.03***
(0.23) (0.10) (0.24) (0.25)
Merger Year +5 (1, 0) 0.66† -0.08 0.66 0.74†
(0.40) (0.13) (0.40) (0.39)
Economic Area Level
R&D Workforce 1.73 -0.99† 1.69 1.72
(2.10) (0.57) (2.04) (1.84)
Constant -22.69*** 1.51 -22.72*** -22.59***
(4.44) (2.00) (4.47) (4.61)
Parent firm fixed effects included.
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10
TABLE 5.  
Mediation Analysis: Imitation of Technological Trajectory (n=2,394) 
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TABLE 6.  
Results of the Moderation Effect Analysis (n=2,394) 
Forward 5-year Drug 
Development
Forward 5-year Drug 
Development
Forward 5-year Drug 
Development
Model 18 Model 19 Model 20
Same Nationality Firms (Related) by Individualism 0.05*
(0.02)
Same Nationality Firms (Pharma) by Individualism 0.12**
(0.05)
Same Nationality Firms (Related) by Prior Experience 0.83**
(0.26)
Same Nationality Firms (Pharma) by Prior Experience 2.59**
(0.91)
Same Nationality Firms (Related) by Entry Sequence 0.21
(0.35)
Same Nationality Firms (Pharma) by Entry Sequence -0.33**
(0.11)
Same Nationality Firm Imitation Ratio -0.18† -0.14† -0.21†
(0.14) (0.12) (0.12)
Same Nationality Alliances -2.08 -2.28 -1.34
(1.62) (1.66) (1.62)
Same Nationality Inventors -1.17** -1.45*** -1.02**
(0.36) (0.40) (0.37)
Same Nationality Firms (Related) -1.34** -2.81*** 3.11*
(0.51) (0.85) (1.46)
Same Nationality Firms (Pharma) -1.34† -7.65*** -10.15**
(0.73) (2.32) (3.37)
Firm-Economic Area Level
Same Nationality Immigrants 0.21 0.29† 0.21
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Other Nationality Firms (Related) -0.12 -0.12 0.32*
(0.15) (0.15) (0.13)
Other Nationality Firms (Pharma) 0.63* 1.11*** 1.08**
(0.28) (0.31) (0.34)
Entry Sequence (by Nationality) -0.41 0.24* 0.25*
(0.52) (0.12) (0.11)
Prior Experience (# of Prior US Entries) 0.27 3.41** 0.47
(0.29) (1.32) (0.31)
Individualism (Hofstede score) 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.29***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.08)
Total Inventors 0.70** 0.78** 0.85***
(0.24) (0.27) (0.25)
Total Alliances 0.38 0.10 -0.38
(0.43) (0.50) (0.44)
Total Patents by Same Nationality Firms 0.22 0.29† 0.25†
(0.16) (0.16) (0.14)
Self Imitation Ratio -0.10 -0.06 -0.10
(0.11) (0.13) (0.11)
Other Nationality Imitation Ratio -0.04 0.03 -0.07
(0.10) (0.12) (0.10)
Firm Level
Cumulative Drug Developments 2.27*** 2.28*** 1.93***
(0.27) (0.25) (0.25)
Merger Year +5 (1, 0) 1.01* 0.83* 1.05*
(0.44) (0.39) (0.44)
Economic Area Level
R&D Workforce 0.63 0.90 1.87
(1.80) (1.95) (1.75)
Constant -18.29*** -33.26*** -38.63***
(4.17) (7.20) (7.52)
Parent firm fixed effects included.
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10
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